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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Notice of Appeal in the instant case was filed with the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) \ vhich grants to 1 he I Jtah Supreme Court < >riginal
appellate jurisdiction over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Coi irt of Appeals does not ha < • e original appellate ji irisdicti.on I he I Jtah Supreme Court then
transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN, § 78A-3102(4) thereby investing the I Jtah Cour I: of Appeals with jurisdiction pursuant to I J I M I CODE
ANN. §78A-4-l 03(2)(j).
By its Motion for Summary Disposition filed herein, Appellee DFI Properties, LLC
("DFI") asserted that this Court lacked jurisdiction and that: instant appeal should be dismissed
pursuant to Utah R. App. P i A Specifically, DFI asserted that the Judgment entered by the
District Coin t was i lot a ' • •

•

i :

• M^n^*- i- tl ie Court's findings of fact concli isions of

law and imposition of sanctions under Rule 11. The Judgment addressed only the ownership of
certain real property and authorized the issuance of an Oi dei of R estitution A minute entry,
which was not signed by the District Court, states: "The court strikes the Defendant's answer and
counterclaim and enters default against the defendant"' (R. 204),,,
Numerous Utah cases hold that an unsigned minute entry in not a "final judgment" for
purposes of appeal. State v. Mace, 921 P.Jd . ; •" • ii 'tali 1996); Swenson Associates Architects,
P.C. v. State Bv and Through Div. of Facilities Const., 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994); Gallardo v.
Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 1990); Ahlstrom v» Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 (Utah 1986): Satherv.
Gross, 727 P2d 212 (I Jtah 1986). •
This Court denied the Motion for Summary Disposition, deferring its ruling on the issues
raised in I he Motion pending plenary presenliiliun and eonsii lout ion ot'lhe case. A ruling on the
523562.3
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Motion for Summary Disposition may determine that this Court lacks jurisdiction requiring the
dismissal of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue One: Whether the cumulative conduct of GR2 Enterprises, LLC ("GR2"), which
included the filing of pleadings purporting to order the District Court to stay its proceedings and
remove the instant case to another jurisdiction, constitutes a violation of Rule 11 and warrants
Rule 11 sanctions, specifically the striking of pleadings and the entry of default judgment?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for evaluating the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions requires a three-tiered approach: (1) findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; and
(3) the type and amount of sanction imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Archuleta v. Galetka. 197 P.3d 650 (Utah 2008); Morse v. Packer. 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah 2000);
Morse v. Packer. 973 R2d 422 (Utah 1999) (citing Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah
1992)).
Issue Two: Whether, in the context of an expedited trial schedule, the District Court
provided appropriate notice to GR2 and an adequate opportunity to respond so as to comply with
due process requirements?
Standard of Review: As part of the three-tiered approach for evaluating the imposition
of Rule 11 sanctions, legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard.
Archuleta v. Galetka. 197 P.3d 650 (Utah 2008); Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah 2000);
Morse v. Packer. 973 P.2d 422 (Utah 1999) (citing Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah
1992)).
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Issue Three: Whether the District Court made sufficient findings on the record to allow
the appellate court to apply the appropriate standards of review?
Standard of Review: As part of the three-tiered approach for evaluating the imposition
of Rule 11 sanctions, findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; legal
conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; and the type and amount of
sanction imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, Archuleta v. Galetka, 197
P.3d 650 (Utah 2008); Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah 2000); Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d
422 (Utah 1999) (citing Barnard v. Sutlifl 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992))!
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISION
Rule 11.

Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations
to court; sanctions*

(a) Signature.
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented by the party.
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by law as
binding. Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit or have
a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule requires an affidavit or a
notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the person may submit a declaration
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-5-705. If a statute requires an affidavit or a notarized,
verified or acknowledged signature and the party electronically files the paper, the
signature shall be notarized pursuant to Utah Code Section 46-1-16.
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is
certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or
the establishment of new law;
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
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opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that
subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose
an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision
(b) or are responsible for the violation.
(c)(1) How initiated.
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct
alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but
shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service
of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged
paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected. If wairranted, the court may award to the party prevailing
on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred in presenting or
opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and employees.
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and
directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated
subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct
by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an
order directing payment to the amount; of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and
other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a
violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement
of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be
sanctioned.
(c)(3) Order, When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined
to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the
provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
The instant case was commenced by the filing of a Complaint for Eviction by DFI against
GR2 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County on October 16,2008 (the "Eviction
Action"). In response to the Complaint for Eviction, GR2 filed an Answer, Counterclaim and
Request for Jury Trial. DFI requested an expedited trial schedule pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-6-810 which provides that an unlawful detainer trial must be commenced within 60
days after service of the complaint if the defendant remains in possession of the property.
Although GR2 requested a regular litigation schedule, it refused to vacate the property
and the District Court, citing the legislative mandate, scheduled a trial for December 17 and 18,
2008. The District Court also established discovery parameters and deadlines and a pretrial
conference was scheduled for December 4. At that conference, the District Court stated that it
would grant a continuance of the trial if GR2 vacated the property by Friday, December 5, at 6:00
p.m. and scheduled a review hearing with counsel for Monday, December 8. GR2 did not vacate
the property by the deadline.
At the beginning of the telephonic hearing on December 8, the District Court informed
counsel that three pleadings had been filed in the Eviction Action containing a caption asserting
the jurisdiction of the First Federal District Court, Western Region, of the Nato Indian Nation:

523562.3

1.

Petition for Hearing to Show Cause, Stay of Proceedings and Declaratory Relief
signed by Mr. Juan Antonio Granados

2.

Order for Hearing to Show Cause signed by Judge Henry Clayton

3.

Order to Stay Proceedings signed by Judge Henry Clayton
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The District Court informed counsel that it would hold a hearing the next day, December 9, to
consider the applicability of Rule 11 to the recently filed pleadings and gave specific instructions
to GR2's counsel to deliver written notice to GR2 as to the time and purpose of the hearing,
including the specific allegations of the District court regarding Rule 11 violations.
At the December 9 hearing, after questioning GR2 through its representative Mr.
Granados, the District Court entered its findings on the record and concluded that the conduct of
GR2 constituted a violation of Rule 11. The District Court imposed sanctions against GR2
stating that the GR2 pleadings were to be stiicken and default judgment entered against GR2. An
Order of Restitution was signed by the District Court and immediately served on GR2.
On December 12,2008 GR2, with new counsel, filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment
and A Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment. The District Court scheduled an expedited
hearing on the Motions for December 23,2008. After hearing oral argument from counsel on
December 23, the District Court denied both Motions.
On December 19, 2008, GR2 filed its Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court
appealing the District Court's ruling of December 9, 2008.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
GR2 is a Utah limited liability company with two members, Juan Antonio Granados and
his wife (R. 13, ^f 7). Mr. and Mrs. Granados owned a 27-acre farm in Fillmore, California (the
"California Property") and decided several years ago to sell it and move to Utah. In 2006, the
Granados formed GR2, conveyed the California property to the limited liability company and
began seeking buyers for the California Property. The Granados also began looking for
residential property to purchase in Utah (R. 13-15,fflj2-4 J ) .
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To facilitate the purchase of property in Utah, GR2, working through an independent
broker, borrowed money from DFI Properties, LLC ("OFF5) (the "Loan") (R. 13,K 5). The Loan
was evidenced by a promissory note in the amount of,$1,775,000.00 (the "Note") (R. 13,
1f 8). To secure payment of the Note, GR2 pledged the California Property and certain Utah
property located at 480 West 870 South in Orem, Utah (the "Utah Property") which was acquired
by GR2 with a portion of the Loan proceeds (R. 14, U 6; R. 92-107).
In 2007, GR2 defaulted under the terms of the Note and in October of 2007 DFI
commenced foreclosure proceedings against the Utah Property (R. 113). Around this same time,
GR2 conveyed fractional interests in the California Properly and the Utah Property to certain
individuals and/or entities, including Marengo Associates and Carpenter Group (R. 11,
116). These individuals and entities in turn filed serial bankruptcy cases in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California (the "California Bankruptcy Court")
invoking the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code (R. 65-57; 68-76; 78-85). Even though GR2
did not file its own bankruptcy case in California, the California Property and the Utah Property
were protected by the automatic stay in the bankruptcy cases of the various third parties claiming
small, undivided ownership interests in the properties (Id.).
Ultimately, the California Bankruptcy Court granted DFI relief from the automatic stay
with respect to the California Property and the Utah Property (R. 78-85). The California
Bankruptcy Court Order was entered May 27,2008 and contained a finding that the multiple
bankruptcy filings were part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud creditors (Id. at 84).
Further, on June 12,2008 the California Bankruptcy Court, sua sponte, issued an Order to
Show Cause, "in response to the numerous transfers of fractional interests in real properties to
entities which then file for Bankruptcy, solely to invoke the automatic stay" (R. 68-76). The
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Order required Gary Barnette dba Marengo Associates and Samuel Adams dba Carpenter Group
to show cause why the Court should not find that the numerous transfers of fractional, undivided
ownership interests were part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and why an
omnibus order granting relief from the automatic stay, applicable to all real property interests
transferred, should not be entered (Id.).
On July 10,2008, the California Bankruptcy Court entered an In Rem Order on Court's
Order to Show Cause which annulled the automatic stay as to all real property transferred to Gary
Barnette dba Marengo Associates or Samuel Adams dba Carpenter Group, including the
California Property and the Utah Property (R. 65-67). The Order provided that the annulment of
the automatic stay was to be effective for two years from the date of the Order and that any
creditor having a security interest in any real property held by or in the name of Gary Barnette
dba Marengo Associates and Samuel Adams dba Carpenter Group need not file a motion for
relief from the automatic stay (Id.).
Before DFI could schedule and conduct a trustee sale on the Utah Property, GR2, on July
10, 2008, filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Utah (the "Utah Bankruptcy Court") (R. 112). DFI filed a Motion to Terminate the Automatic
Stay relying in part on the Orders from the California Bankruptcy Court. On September 17,
2008, the Utah Bankruptcy Court entered an Order Granting Relief from Automatic Stay as to the
Utah Property (R. 61-63) and on October 3,2008, the Utah Property was sold at trustee's sale to
DFI (R. 3-4).
On October 10, 2008, DFI filed its Complaint for Eviction against GR2 and Does 1
through 10 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County; the action from which the
instant appeal arises (the "Eviction Action") (R. 2-7). On October 21 GR2 filed an Answer,
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Counterclaim and Jury Demand (R. 9-30). On October 23 DFI filed its Motion for Expedited
Hearing on Unlawful Detainer pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-810 (R. 33-34).
Meanwhile, in the pending Utah bankruptcy case of GR2, the bankruptcy trustee, at the
behest of GR2, filed a Motion to Set Aside Sale with respect to the trustee sale of the Utah
Property held on October 3,2008, alleging that DFI had not complied with certain notice
requirements under Utah law (R. 17-18). In response to DFFs Motion for Expedited Hearing in
the Eviction Action, GR2 filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings in the State Court arguing that the
Eviction Action should not move forward until the Utah Bankruptcy Court had ruled on the
bankruptcy trustee's Motion to set aside the foreclosure sale (R. 42-43).
At a hearing on November 3, the District Court set an expedited trial date of December
17, 2008 (R. 291, p. 27:23) and agreed to continue any further proceedings in the Eviction
Action until after the Utah Bankruptcy Court hearing on the bankruptcy trustee's Motion to Set
Aside Sale scheduled for November 5, 2008 (R. 291, p. 21:15 - P. 22:5). On November 12,
2008, the parties presented before the District Court in a follow-up hearing (R. 292). At that
time, the District Court was informed that the Motion to Set Aside Sale had been denied by the
Bankruptcy Court (R. 292, p. 3:17-18). Accordingly, the District Court established timelines for
initial disclosures, discovery, and jury instructions (R. 292, pp. 51-53).
By Motion dated November 7, 2008, GR2 had requested that the District Court alter the
expedited trial date from December 17,2008 to February of 2009 and allow the parties more time
to address the numerous issues raised in GR2Ts Counterclaim (R. 145-146). At the November 12
hearing, the District Court offered to place the Eviction Action on a conventional litigation
schedule if GR2 would vacate the Utah Property (R. 292, p. 50:10-14). GR2 refused to vacate
the Utah Property (R. 292, p. 51:4-5).

5235623

9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On November 24, 2008, DFI filed and served a Notice of Deposition for the deposition of
Mr. Granados for Wednesday, December 3, 2008 (R. 176-177). The deposition did not occur.
On November 26,2008, Randall L. Jeffs and Liisa A. Hancock of the law firm Jeffs &
Jeffs filed their Motion to Withdraw as Counsel (R. 178-183).
On November 26, 2008, DFI served its first set of Requests for Admissions, Request for
Production of Documents and Interrogatories upon GR2 (R. 184-185). On December 1, 2008,
DFI filed its Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel (R. 186-189).
At a hearing on December 4, the District Court considered GR2Ts Motion to Alter Trial
Date and ruled that if GR2 vacated the Utah Property by Friday, December 5 at 6:00 p.m., the
Court would grant a continuance of the trial (R. 193). GR2 did not vacate the Utah Property by
the deadline (R. 293, p. 3:4-5).
On Monday, December 8, three pleadings were filed in the Eviction Action (referred to
hereinafter as the "Nato Nation Pleadings")(R. 194-202). The first pleading was entitled
"Petition for Hearing to Show Cause, Stay of Proceedings and Declaratory Relief It was signed
by Mr. Granados (R. 194-195). The second pleading was entitled "Order for Hearing to Show
Cause" and was signed by "Judge Henry Clayton". The Order for Hearing to Show Cause
purported to schedule a hearing of the Eviction Action on December 16, 2008 before the
Honorable Henry Clayton at a place to be determined (R. 196-197). The third pleading was
entitled "Order to Stay Proceedings" and was also signed by "Judge Henry Clayton". The Order
to Stay Proceedings purported to order the District Court to refrain from adjudicating the
Eviction Action (R. 198-202). The captions of the Nato Nation Pleadings asserted the following
jurisdiction: "In the First Federal District Court, Western Region, Presiding Judge Henry
Clayton" (R. 194-202).
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As it happened, the District Court had previously scheduled a telephonic hearing for
December 8. During the teleconference, the District Count informed both counsel of the filing of
the Nato Nation Pleadings (R. 293, p. 3:16 - p. 4:5) and indicated that the Court would consider
the applicability of Rule 11 to the Nato Nation Pleadings at a hearing the next day (R. 293, p.
6:3-4). The District Court gave specific instructions to GR2's counsel regarding the written
notice to be provided to GR2 (R. 293, p. 6:3 - 7:2).
At the December 9 hearing, after questioning GR2 through its representative Mr.
Granados, the District Court entered its findings and conclusions on the record (R. 294). The
district Court determined that the conduct of GR2 constituted a violation of Rule 11 and imposed
sanctions as a consequence of the Rule 11 violation, striking GR2's pleadings and entering
default judgment GR2 (R. 294).
The District Court entered Judgment against GR2, finding that DFI was the owner of the
Utah Property and that it was entitled to possession of the Utah Property (R. 218-223). The
Judgment also provided that an Order of Restitution would immediately issue requiring GR2 and
other persons residing in the Utah Property to vacate and deliver possession of the Utah Property
to DFI within three days (Id.). An Order of Restitution was signed by the District Court and
immediately served upon GR2 requiring GR2 to turn over possession of the Utah Property to DFI
(R.294,p.9:13-18).
On December 12, 2008 GR2, with new counsel, filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment (R.
227-228) and A Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment (R. 235-236). At an expedited hearing
on the Motions on December 23, 2008, and after hearing oral argument from counsel, the District
Court denied both Motions (R. 295, p. 27:23, p. 28:3-4).
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On December 19, 2008, GR2 filed its Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme Court
appealing the District Court's ruling of December 9, 2008 (R. 266-267).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The District Court is afforded great leeway in selecting the type of sanctions to impose
under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Once the District Court has determined the
relevant facts concerning the offending behavior and has concluded that the offending behavior
constitutes a violation of Rule 11, it has wide discretion to impose an appropriate sanction that
will deter the offending behavior.
The District Court's findings of fact regarding the behavior of GR2, as set forth in the
record, are not disputed by GR2. Instead, GR2 argues that Rule 11 is inapplicable to its
offending behavior because Rule 11 applies only to attorneys and unrepresented parties and GR2
is neither. Rule 11 clearly applies to represented parties: "[Tjhe court may . . . impose an
appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or
are responsible for the violation." Rule 11(c).
The cumulative conduct of GR2 constitutes a violation of Rule 11 as a matter of law.
The District Court determined that GR2 had participated in a pattern of conduct for the improper
purpose of delaying DATs legal foreclosure efforts, including transferring fractional ownership
interests in its properties to third parties who in turn filed serial bankruptcy cases in California.
The California Bankruptcy Court entered two separate Orders finding that the serial bankruptcy
filings were part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud creditors. The District Court also
considered GR2's conduct during the Eviction Action. When faced with the filing of the Nato
Nation Pleadings, which the District Court found were imposed for the purpose of causing
unnecessary delay and increasing the costs of litigation, the Court determined that the Nato
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Nation Pleadings were part of GR2's wrongful scheme to delay the enforcement of DATs legal
rights*
As a separate legal conclusion, the District Court determined that the Nato Nation
Pleadings were frivolous and not warranted by existing law. The Nato Nation Pleadings
purported to strip the District Court of its authority to hear the Eviction Action and ordered its
appearance at an Order to Show Cause hearing in the First Federal District Court, Western
Region, Presiding Judge Henry Clayton, of the Nato Indian Nation. This act of blatant defiance
of the judicial system in general and the District Court in particular, constitutes a violation of
Rule 11.
The sanction of striking pleadings and entering default judgment, while not specifically
mentioned in Rule 11, is clearly available under Rule 11 and can be imposed in appropriate
circumstances. Further, the District Court's choice of sanctions can only be disturbed if the
appellate court determines that the choice was an abuse of discretion. In addition, the District
Court has inherent powers to strike a party's pleadings and enter default judgment where such is
warranted by a party's wrongful conduct.
The District Court complied with the requirements of due process in giving GR2 notice of
the conduct alleged to be a violation of Rule 11 and the possible consequences of that conduct.
That information was provided to GR2, in writing, by its counsel at the express direction of the
District Court. GR2 was afforded an opportunity to respond to the Rule 11 allegations; t he
written notice included the time and place of the hearing scheduled by the District Court to
consider the sea sponge allegations.
The hearing was scheduled on one day's notice; the day after the filing of the Nato Nation
Pleadings. Within the context of the extraordinary circumstances resulting from the expedited
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trial schedule mandated by Utah law, and GR2's prior conduct in the Eviction Action, the short
notice was not only reasonable but necessary. GR2 availed itself of the opportunity to respond
and did, in fact, address the Rule 11 allegations at the December 9 hearing.
The District Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, entered orally on the record,
are sufficient to enable the appellate application of the three tier standard of review set forth in
Sutliff and its progeny; but only if this Court determines that the Judgment in the Eviction Action
is a final order for purposes of the District Court's Rule 11 determinations, and that the pending
appeal is not moot
ARGUMENTS
I,

The cumulative conduct of GR2, which included the filing of
pleadings purporting to order the District Court to stay its
proceedings and remove the matter to another jurisdiction,
constitutes a violation of Rule 11 and warrants the imposition
of Rule 11 sanctions, specifically the striking of pleadings and
the entry of default judgment
A.

The District Court's findings of fact are supported by evidence.

Before rendering a decision regarding GR2's violation of Rule 11, the District Court
considered evidence in the record as well as GR2's verbal response to the Court's Order to Show
Cause at the December 9 hearing. All of the evidence overwhelmingly supports the District
Court's findings of fact, none of which is disputed by GR2L
The three Nato Nation Pleadings were the trigger for the District Court to review the
applicability of Rule 11, but the court relied on other documents in the record as well,
1.

Declaration of Mr, Granados filed in the Utah Bankruptcy Court (R 9-15). The

Declaration stated that GR2 had transferred undivided fractional interests in the
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California Property and the Utah Property to individuals and entities "to preserve our
equity in our properties" (R, 11, f 16).
2.

Order Granting Motion for Relief from Stay entered by the California Bankruptcy

Court on May 27.2008 (R. 78-85). The individuals and entities to whom GR2
transferred fractional ownership interests, Samuel Andrews, Gary Barnette, Carpenter
Group, Marengo Associates and Capistrano Enterprises, filed serial bankruptcy cases in
the California Bankruptcy Court improperly invoking the automatic stay protection for
the California Property and the Utah Property (R. 84, f 9). This Order was entered in
Case No. 2:08-11370-AA, in re Samuel Andrews, dba Carpenter Group (R. 85). In the
Order the California Bankruptcy Court specifically found that the bankruptcy filings were
"part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud creditors" (R. 84, ^ 9).1
3.

Order to Show Cause issued, sea sponge, by the California Bankruptcy Court (R.

69-76). The Order to Show Cause was issued "in response to the numerous transfers of
fractional interests in real properties to entities, which then file for bankruptcy, solely to
invoke the protection of the automatic stay." (R. 76). The Order to show Cause lists 30
bankruptcy cases involving the transfers of fractional interests, including In re Samuel
Andrews, Case No. 2:08-11370-AA (R. 75:2).
4.

In Rem Relief Order on Court's Order to Show Cause entered by the California

Bankruptcy Court on July 10, 2008 (R. 65-67). In this Order, the California Bankruptcy
Court made a finding that "the real property transfers described in this Court's Order to
Show Cause are part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors." (R. 67).

Mr. Granados states in his Declaration that he never received any papers from the California Bankruptcy Court
(R. 10-11,118). However, the Proof of Service by Mail attached to the Order Granting Motion for Relief from Stay
states that a copy of the Order was mailed to Mr. Granados (R. 78-79).
523562.3
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The District Court relied on these four pleadings in finding that GR2 had already been
involved in "devious" conduct in attempting to avoid the DAI foreclosure. (R. 295, p. 30:18-22).
The filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings was a continuation of GR2's delay tactics and the District
Court found that they were filed specifically to derail the scheduled trial (R. 295, p. 31:19-22).
As further support for the finding that the filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings was for the
improper purpose of delay, the District Court analyzed the timing of the filing on December 8.
This was not an ordinary case but was being conducted on an expedited basis as required by the
Utah unlawful detainer statutes (R. 295, p. 30:24-25). The Court found that GR2 was trying to
derail the Court's ability to follow a legislative mandate (R. 295, p. 31:11-12) and that it was
"especially egregious" that the specific purpose of filing the Nato Nation Pleadings was to derail
the trial that was scheduled less than 10 days away (R. 295, p. 31:19-22).
Finally, the District Court considered the content of the Nato Nation Pleadings,
particularly the language purporting to order a stay of the proceedings in the District Court. The
District Court was concerned that the Nato Nation Pleadings constituted a violation of the
Criminal Code of the State of Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-513; specifically the crime of
false judicial or official notice (R. 294, p .8)} But beyond that, the District Court found that
there was no reasonable basis to believe that the Nato Nation Pleadings were anything other than
frivolous and that they had been submitted for the sole purpose of delay (R. 294, p 8:8-12).
All of the evidence supports the District Court's findings that GR21s conduct was
egregious and that the Nato Nation Pleadings were frivolous, not warranted by existing law and

Section 76-8-513 provides: A person is guilt/ of a class B misdemeanor who, with a purpose to procure the
compliance of another with a request made by the person, knowingly sends, mails, or delivers to the person a notice or
other writing which has no judicial or other sanction but which in its format or appearance simulates a seal, or printed
form of a federal, state or local government or an instrumentality thereof, or is otherwise calculated to induce a belief
that it does have a judicial or other official sanction.
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were filed for an improper purpose; delaying the expedited trial and needlessly increasing the
costs of litigation. The Nato Nation Pleadings were a blatant attempt to defy and disrespect the
authority of the District Court. GR2, through its representative Mr. Granados, clearly intended to
subvert the jurisdiction of the District Court in an effort to avoid the trial on December 17 and
maintain its possession of the Utah Property.
In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the District Court's findings of fact, those
findings can be disturbed only if they are against the "clear" or "great" weight of the evidence.
Bountiful v. Rilev, 784 P.2d 1174,1175 (Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776
P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989). In this case, there is a total lack of evidence to support any
findings other than those stated on the record by the District Court.
B.

The conduct of GR2 constitutes a violation of Rule 11 as a
matter of law.

In determining what constitutes a violation of Rule 11, one must look first to the language
of the rule. The applicable portion of Rule 11(b) states:
(b) Representations to the court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;...
As detailed in subsection A., supra, the District Court found that the Nato Nation
Pleadings had been presented for the improper purposes of delay and needless increase in the
cost of litigation. However, GR2 asserts in Appellant's Brief that it cannot be held responsible
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for its conduct under Rule 11 because Rule 11 (b) applies only to attorneys and unrepresented
parties and GR2 was represented by counsel at the time the Nato Nation Pleadings were filed.
This argument completely ignores the language of Rule 11 (c): u[T]he court may impose
an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible
for the violation" (emphasis added). In the instant case there is no dispute that GR2, through Mr.
Granados, was responsible for filing the Nato Nation Pleadings (R. 294, p. 3:15-17). GR2 went
outside the rules governing civil proceedings and filed its own pleadings, even though it had
obtained counsel to represent it in the Eviction Action.
Where a represented party is responsible for a violation of Rule 11, the court may
sanction that party under Rule 11. Union Planters Bank v. L & J Dev. Co., 115 F.3d 378,384385 (6th Cir. 1997). See also. Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277,1293-1294
(1lthCir.2002) (affirming imposition of sanction enjoining plaintiff from filing future actions
against defendant when monetary sanctions were found to be insufficient deterrent); Fries v.
Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 458 (7thCir. 1998) (court imposed sanctions on party and his counsel for
filing claims that were frivolous, legally unreasonable, without factual foundation and asserted
for an improper purpose); Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 390 (E.D.Cal.
1992) (party represented by counsel sanctioned by striking answer and counterclaim and entering
default judgment where there was pattern of delay and obvious disregard for court's authority).
If GR2's interpretation of Rule 11 were adopted, the very purpose of the rule would be
defeated. GR2 cannot insulate itself from the requirements of Rule 11 by hiring counsel,
refusing to avail itself of the advise and assistance of counsel, and then acting on its own in an
improper manner. Interestingly, none of the five arguments propounded by GR2 in Appellant's
Brief address the nature of GR2's conduct. Absent reliance on the specious argument that a
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represented party can act with impunity, GR2 would have to defend its actions on the merits
which, DAI asserts, cannot be done.
GR2fs reliance on the Vermont case, Agency of NEitural Resources v. Lvndonville
Savings Bank & Trust Co.. 811 A.2d 1232 (Vt. 2001) is misplaced. First, it is not clear whether
the Vermont version of Rule 11 contained the same language as Utah Rule 11(c) which
specifically allows the imposition of sanctions upon a represented party. Second, the ruling of
the Vermont court, denying the motion for sanctions, was based upon the fact that the offending
papers were dismissed within the safe harbor period of Rule 11. Accordingly, the court's
language limiting the applicability of Rule 11 is simply dicta. Third, the Vermont court's dicta
does not provide precedent or even helpful direction for the Utah courts.
In another misguided attempt to insulate GR2 from the legal consequences of its actions,
Appellant's Brief argues that Mr. Granados cannot act for GR2 in the case because he is not an
attorney and because GR2 cannot act in a pro se capacity. In filing the Nato Nation Pleadings,
Mr. Granados was not purporting to act as GR2's counsel. He was acting as an agent of GR2, in
his capacity as a member/manager of a limited liability company, which is the only way a
corporate entity can take action. Mr. Granados' statements at the December 9 hearing were not
made as a legal representative of GR2 but were in response to the District Court's questions
directed to a party, GR2; in the nature of questioning a witness. While Mr. Granados cannot
provide legal representation to GR2, he can certainly act in a representative capacity on behalf of
GR2 in answering questions and causing GR2 to take actions, including the filing of the Nato
Nation Pleadings.
Where the District Court has made findings with respect to the conduct of a party,
specifically; that pleadings were filed for the improper purpose of delaying an expedited trial;
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that the filing of the pleadings was a continuation of a devious plan to avoid foreclosure and the
loss of the Utah Property; and that the pleadings were frivolous and attempted to usurp the
authority of the District Court; a conclusion that this conduct constitutes a violation of Rule 11 is
correct, as a matter of law.
C.

The sanctions imposed by the District Court are appropriate
and not an abuse of discretion*

Rule 11(c) specifically states that the court "may impose an appropriate sanction", Utah
case law interprets this language as providing great leeway to trial courts in allowing them to
tailor sanctions under Rule 11 to fit the requirements of a specific case. Bailey-Allen Co, Inc. v.
Kurzet 945 P.2d 180,195 (Utah CtApp. 1997); R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc.,
936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997).
In determining an appropriate sanction, a court should keep in mind the purpose of Rule
11 sanctions which is to "deter baseless filings and curb abuses." Business Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Communications Enterprises. Inc.. 498 U.S. 533, 553,111 S.Ct 922, 934, 112
L.Ed.2d 1140 (1991). To that end, Rule 11 creates wide parameters for a trial court faced with
determining an appropriate sanction. The only applicable limiting language3 in Rule 11 is
subsection (c)(2): "A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is
sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated."
The District Court carefully considered other options before ordering that GR2Ts
pleadings be stricken and default judgment entered against it. But the Court concluded that
lesser sanctions, such as an admonition or awarding attorneys' fees, would not cure the

Rule 11(c)(2)(A) sets one other limit not applicable in the instant case. Monetary sanctions cannot be awarded
against a represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2);Le., presenting a pleading, written motion or other paper
to the court where the claims, defenses and other legal contentions are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.
523562.3
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significant problem created by GR2's conduct (R. 295, p. 31:14-19). Further, the Court
determined that GR2fs egregious conduct interfered with the orderly presentation of matters in
the court and undermined the judicial system and therefore justified the imposition of a harsh
sanction (R. 295, p. 31:23-25 and p. 32:1-3).
GR2 asserts that the District Court's decision to strike pleadings and enter default
judgment is not an authorized sanction under Rule 11 and that there is no precedent for such a
sanction under Utah law. Where there is no Utah precedent with respect to an aspect of Rule 11,
it is appropriate to look to cases and authorities interpreting Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is substantially similar to the Utah rule. The Advisory Committee Notes to the
1993 Amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicate that dismissal is
clearly contemplated as a sanction:
[T]his restriction does not limit the court's power to impose sanctions
or remedial orders that may have collateral financial consequences
upon a party, such as dismissal of a claim, preclusion of a defense,
or preparation of an amended pleading.
While there may not be a Utah case directly addressing this issue, federal courts have
concluded that the choices available to trial courts under Rule 11 include striking pleadings and
entering default judgment against an offending party. Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co,, 307 F.3d
1277, 1293-1294 (1 lthCir.2002) (affirming imposition of sanction enjoining plaintiff from filing
future actions against defendant); Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria. 144 F.R.D. 384, 390
(E.D.Cal.1992) (party represented by counsel sanctioned by striking answer and counterclaim
and entering default judgment where there was pattern of delay and obvious disregard for court's
authority).
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GR2 argues, citing the Bailey-Allen case, 945 P.2d at 990, that the normal sanction for a
Rule 11 violation is recovery of attorneys' fees. However, the instant case is anything but
normal. The District Court found the conduct of GR2, within the context of an expedited
schedule mandated by Utah law, to be "extraordinary" (R. 295, p. 27:20; R. 295, p. 30:24). The
District Court described the circumstances as exceptional:
So in totality, I will freely admit and acknowledge that this, these are exceptional
circumstances and that typically, if this had been a case where we were months
out from trial, I would have looked to a lesser sanction. But given the timing of
this case and the what I believe blatant attempt there was here to derail a trial
setting, I am going to stick with the ruling that I made.
(R. 295, p. 33:3-9).
In Jimenez v, Madison Area Technical College. 321 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh
Circuit considered a case of first impression regarding dismissal as a Rule 11 sanction. The
Court deftly described the situation as follows:
We recognize that dismissal is a harsh sanction. Thus, we understand
why we have uncovered no prior instance in which this Court has
reviewed such an obvious and serious Rule 11 sanction for an abuse of
discretion. Nonetheless, it is proper for the trial court to impose a
severe sanction where the sanction is sufficient to deter repetition of the
misconduct or to deter similar conduct by third parties.
Id. at 657.
The Jimenez Court affirmed the trial court's sanction of dismissal of the case, stating that
the sanction "[met] the requisite criteria in this case, given the egregious nature of Jimenez's
conduct. Jimenez's claim was so unmeritorious and her behavior so deceptive that the filing of
her baseless claim amounted to a veritable attack on our system of justice.55 Id.
The District Court made similar findings in the instant matter. GR2's conduct interfered
with the orderly presentation of matters in the state court and was an attempt to undermine the
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judicial system. (R. 295, p. 31:23-25 and p. 32:1-3). The District Court also concluded that a
lesser sanction would not deter similar conduct by GR2. In order to maintain the integrity of its
courtroom administration and the judicial system as a whole, the District Court determined to
strike GR2's pleadings and enter default judgment
All of GR2's prior conduct, together with the filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings on the
eve of trial, which pleadings defied the authority of the District Court and purported to order the
District Court to stay its proceeding, warrant the severe sanctions imposed. In reviewing the
District Court's decision as to the sanction chosen and imposed, this Court need only determine
whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances of this case, the
sanctions of striking pleadings and entering default judgment, while severe, are appropriate and
well within the bounds of discretion to be exercised by the District Court.
D.

The District Court has inherent power to strike pleadings and
enter default judgment to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the integrity of its Orders.

It is well established that courts have inherent power to levy sanctions in response to
abusive litigation practices and those sanctions include the striking of pleadings and the entry of
default judgment. Roadway Express. Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463,
65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980). The Utah Supreme Court has considered the scope of inherent judicial
power and in Chen v. Stewart. 123 P.3d 416 (Utah 2005), established the parameters of a trial
court's inherent power in the context of allegations of criminal contempt.
The Chen opinion states that a court's authority to enter sanctions can be both statutory
and inherent. Id. at 427. See also. Chambers v. NASACO Inc.. 501 U.S. 32, 49,111 S.Ct 2123,
115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (the inherent power of the court can be invoked even if procedural rules
exist which sanction the same conduct). While a court's authority to hold a person in contempt
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and enter sanctions is circumscribed by due process requirements, in appropriate circumstances
the striking of pleadings and the entry of default judgment is within the bounds of a court's
inherent power.
In sum, a court has the inherent authority to strike a party's pleadings
and enter a default judgment if the party engages in conduct designed to
improperly influence the court's decision on the merits of the case,
such as perjury or obstruction of justice, or if the conduct itself tends to
demonstrate bad faith or a lack of merit.
Chen, 123 P.3d at 429,
In the instant case, GR2rs conduct was in the nature of contempt. In particular, the
District Court found that the filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings was for an improper purpose:
preventing the Court from conducting the legislatively mandated unlawful detainer trial In filing
the Nato Nation Pleadings, GR2 mocked the authority of the District Court as well as the state
judicial system. GR2 scorned the District Court's Orders and attempted to interfere with the
Court's ability to promote the efficient administration of justice. GR2*s conduct, taken as a
whole, shows bad faith and gives rise to a reasonable inference that its claims are without merit.
The District Court found GR2's conduct to be "egregious" and that the particular
circumstances of the case were "extraordinary". This, together with the District Court's other
findings, clearly support the Court's invoking its inherent power as an alternate basis for
imposing sanctions on GR2.
II.

Whether, in the context of an expedited trial schedule, the District
Court provided GR2 with appropriate notice and an opportunity to
respond so as to comport with due process?

Before imposing sanction on a party under Rule 11, due process requires that the party
receive adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. This requirement, however, does not
necessitate a formal evidentiary hearing, but rather, it is sufficient if the party is given an
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opportunity to respond, either orally or in writing. Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah.
31 P.3d 543 (Utah 2001). Further, in considering whether GR2 was afforded due process, this
Court must look at the specific circumstances which were in play at the time the questioned
notice took place. "[D]ue process is a flexible concept and the particular procedural protections
vary, depending upon all the circumstances." Id. (quoting Poulsen v. Frear. 946 P.2d 738, 743
(Utah Q. App. 1997).
The instant case began with an Eviction Action filed by DFI against GR2 to obtain
possession of the Utah Property after it was purchased at fDreclosure sale on October 2, 2008.
Because GR2 remained in possession of the Utah Property, the District Court was required to
conduct a trial on the matter within 60 days of the service of the complaint. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-6-810. It is within the context of this expedited schedule that this Court must determine
whether GR2 was afforded appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard.
On November 12, 2008, the District Court set a trial date of December 17 and established
an expedited schedule for discovery and other pretrial matters. The offending Nato Nation
Pleadings were filed with the District Court on December 8, 2008, less than 10 days before the
scheduled trial and only two days before jury instructions were to be filed. Prior to that date,
GR2 had filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings, which was denied, GR2, through its representative
Mr. Granados, had failed to appear for a properly scheduled deposition after it had been
rescheduled at GR2's request, GR2 had filed a Motion to Alter Trial Date seeking to postpone the
December 17 trial to February of 2009, which was denied; and GR2's counsel had filed a Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel.
With that backdrop, and faced with an impending trial date, the District Court had little
choice but to address, as quickly as possible, the Nato Nation Pleadings which purported to usurp
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the court's authority to administer its case and conduct a trial. Accordingly, at a scheduled
hearing on December 8, which, by coincidence was the date of the filing of the Nato Nation
Pleadings, the District Court, sua sponte, issued on the record an Order to Show Cause and
scheduled a hearing to consider the issues raised therein for the next day at 2:30 p.m.
The District Court clearly set out the allegations regarding the alleged violation of Rule
11: that the Nato Nation Pleadings were filed for an improper purpose, to unnecessarily delay the
Eviction Action and to needlessly increase the costs of the litigation; that the contentions set
forth in the Nato Nation Pleadings were not warranted by existing law; and that the Nato Nation
Pleadings were frivolous (R. 293, p. 6:11-16). The District Court also required counsel for GR2
to deliver a letter to GR2 giving it notice of the December 9 hearing and including the allegations
of the Court relating to the Nato Nation Pleadings (R. 293, p. 6:3-6). Further, the District Court
specifically stated that it was considering imposing the sanctions of striking all of GR2's
pleadings and entering default judgment against it, giving GR2 notice of the seriousness of the
matter and the possible consequences (R. 293, p. 4:14-17).
While one day's notice, in the abstract, may be unreasonable, under the existing
circumstances it was not only reasonable but necessary. Without a resolution of the Rule 11
allegations, the Court and DFI were in an untenable position. The Court was required to conduct
a trial within 60 days per legislative mandate. To keep that schedule would require DFI to
expend considerable money and resources to prepare for trial. If the Court set a hearing on the
Rule 11 issues in five days, or even three days, DFI would have no choice but to prepare for trial,
not knowing what the outcome of the Court's Order to Show Cause might be. In that situation,
the District Court's decision to hold a hearing the next day was not only reasonable, it was the
only responsible decision to be made.
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GR2 was given an adequate opportunity to respond to the Rule 11 allegations as required
by Utah law. In Poulsen v. Frear. 946 P.2d 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), this Court expounded
upon the specific procedural protections that must be afforded prior to the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions. The opinion instructs that affording a party the right to respond does not require an
adversarial, evidentiary hearing. Due process is satisfied if the trial court gives the party against
whom sanctions are to be imposed an opportunity to file a brief or otherwise respond. "[T]he
accused must be given an opportunity to respond, either orally or in writing, to justify his or her
actions." Id., (citing Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5A Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 2d § 1337, at 129 (2d ed.1990)).
GR 2, by and through its member/manager, Mr. Granados, had the opportunity to address
the District Court regarding the Rule 11 allegations and in fact did address them at the December
9 hearing. Waiting two or three days or even a week would not have changed the fact the Mr.
Granados acknowledged signing and submitting the Nato Nation Pleadings. The other evidence
considered by the District Court was already part of the record; again, something that would
remain the same on December 16 as it was on December 9.
Within the context of an statutorily mandated expedited schedule, the District Court's
notice of one day to respond to the Rule 11 allegations was appropriate and afforded GR2 the
necessary procedural protections required by due process.
IH.

Whether the District Court made sufficient findings on the
record to allow the appellate court to apply the appropriate
standards of review?

When imposing sanctions, a court must describe the conduct determined to constitute a
violation of Rule 11 and explain the basis for the sanction imposed. Rule 11(c)(3). "[TJhere
should be findings on the record or other appropriate explanation of the trial court's rationale that

5235623

27 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

will enable the appellate courts to apply the SutlifF standard. Morse v. Packer. 973 P.2d 422,425
(Utah 1999).
Unfortunately, GR2 filed its Notice of Appeal before the District Court had an
opportunity to finalize and enter its findings of fact, conclusions of law and written Order. Such
a document would surely be more precise and allow for a less burdensome review.4 However,
Rule 11 does not mandate a written order and the District Court record provides the necessary
findings and conclusions to be reviewed by this Court. The record contains a statement of the
evidence supporting the District Court's finding that the filing of the Nato Nation Pleadings was
for improper purposes; unnecessary delay and needless increase of costs of litigation. The
District Court also explains its finding that the Nato Nation Pleadings were frivolous and without
basis in existing law, and its conclusion that GR2's conduct constituted a violation of Rule 11.
With respect to its choice of sanctions, there is ample explanation in the transcripts
regarding the District Court's consideration of lesser sanctions and the reasoning behind its
decision that only the striking of pleadings and entry of default judgment would be an effective
deterrent in this case.
GR2 cites Crocket v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co,. 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1996),
to support its assertion that the District Court's findings are inadequate. However, Crocket is
inapposite to the instant case. In the Crocket case, the Court determined that a single finding was
insufficient to support the imposition of sanctions because it precluded the appellate court from
determining what conduct was being judged and the basis for the trial court's imposition of
sanctions. Id. at 231.

The jurisdictional aspects of the lack of a written order are discussed in the section entitled "Statement of
Jurisdiction", supra.
523562.3
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At the Rule 11 hearing, held December 9,2008, and again during the December 23, 2008
hearing for GR 2's Motion to Set Aside the Order, the District Court spent considerable time and
in considerable detail, entered its findings and conclusions on the record. Section I. of
Appellee's Brief, supra, sets forth the specific citations to these findings and conclusions. The
record in this case, including pleadings and transcripts, provides a sufficient basis to enable this
Court to apply the Sutliff standard.
CONCLUSION
In entering sanctions against GR2, the District Court carefully considered the evidence,
made its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record, and imposed an appropriate
sanction under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the District Court is
imbued with the inherent power to enter appropriate sanctions to ensure the orderly
administration of justice and maintain the integrity of its Orders.
GR2 was afforded notice of the scope and purpose of the Rule 11 hearing and an
opportunity to respond at the hearing. The timing and nature of the notice were reasonable under
the extraordinary circumstances faced by the District Court.
WHEREFORE, DFI Properties, LLC, respectfully requests this Court to deny GR2's
appeal in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted this<JL day of August, 2009.
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

Carolyn Montgomery
Thomas B. Price
Attorneys for Appellee DFI Propfo/iies, LLC
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ADDENDUM

1. Judgment entered by the District Court, December 9,2008 (R. 218-223)
2. Order of Restitution executed by the District Court (R. 214-216)
3. Petition for Hearing to Show Cause, Stay of Proceedings and Declaratory Relief
captioned in the First Federal District Court, Western Region of the Ministry of Justice,
Nato Indian Nation (R. 194-195)
4. Order for Hearing to Show Cause captioned in the First Federal District Court, Western
Region of the Ministry of Justice, Nato Indian Nation (R. 196-197)
5. Order to Stay Proceedings captioned in the First Federal District Court, Western Region
of the Ministry of Justice, Nato Indian Nation (R. 198-202)
6. Declaration of Juan Antonio Granados filed in the Utah Bankruptcy Court (R. 9-15)
7. Order Granting Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay entered by California
Bankruptcy Court (R. 78-85)
8. Order to Show Cause entered by the California Bankruptcy Court (R. 68-76)
9. In Rem Order on Order to Show Cause entered by trie California Bankruptcy Court(R.
65-66)
10. Transcript of Hearing; December 8,2008 (R. 293)
11. Transcript of Hearing; December 9,2008 (R. 294)
12. Transcript of Hearing; December 23,2008 (R. 295)
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Carolyn Montgomery (2297)
Thomas B. Price (8254)
Zions Bank Building
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127
WOODALL & WASSERMANN
James H. Woodall (5361)
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Telephone: (801) 254-9450
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
DFI PROPERTIES, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT
Civil No. 080103867
Judge David N. Mortensen

vs.

GR 2 ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties, the Answer and
Counterclaim of Defendant having been stricken pursuant to this Court's Order dated
December 9,2008, the Court being fully advised in the facts of the case, and good cause
appearing,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of
Plaintiff, DPI Properties, LLC and against Defendants, GR 2 Enterprises, LLC and John
Does 1 through 10 as follows:
1.

DFI Properties, LLC is the owner and entitled to possession of the real

property located at 480 West 870 South, Orem, Utah (the "Property"), and more
particularly described as:
All of Lot 1, Plat "C", including a vacation of Lots 3 & 4, Plat "B",
Jensen Cove Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on
file in the Office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah.
2.

An Order of Restitution shall immediately issue in the form attached

hereto as Exhibit A, requiring Defendants GR 2 Enteiprises and Does 1 through 10, those
persons who may be residing at the Property by or through GR 2 Enterprises' possession
of the Property, to vacate and deliver possession of the Property to DFI Properties, LLC
within three (3) calendar days following service of the Order of Restitution,
3.

This Judgment may be supplemented, upon the presentation of appropriate

evidence, by an award of damages to Plaintiff resulting from Defendants' unlawful
detainer and any waste of the Property during Defendants' possession of the Property.
The total amount awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to this Paragraph shall be three (3) times
the amount of actual damages assessed.
4.

This Judgment may be supplemented, upon the filing of an Affidavit by

counsel for Plaintiff, in an amount equal to the reasonable attorney fees incurred by
Plaintiff.

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5.

Pursuant to 78B-6-811(4), this Judgment shall be issued and enforced

immediately and execution upon the Judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry
of the Judgment

,

OK
DATED this

' *~day of December, 2008.
BYTHE COURT

Judge David N. Mo^teiis^^v^;^?!
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Carolyn Montgomery (2297)
Thomas B.Price (8254)
Zions Bank Building
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127
WOODALL & WASSERMANN
James H. Wbodall (5361)
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Telephone: (801) 254-9450
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

DFI PROPERTIES, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER OF RESTITUTION
Civil No. 080103867
Judge David N. Mortensen

GR 2 ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Defendants.

On December

, 2008, Judgment was entered by this Court against

Defendants GR 2 Enterprises, LLC and Does 1 through 10, ordering that GR 2
Enterprises, LLC and Does 1 through 10, within three (3) calendar days following
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service of this Order, vacate and deliver possession of the real property located at 480
West 870 South, Orem, Utah (the "Property"), and mote particularly described as:
All of Lot 1, Plat "C", including a vacation of Lots 3 & 4, Plat "B",
Jensen Cove Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on
file in the Office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
L

Defendants shall vacate the Property, remove all personal property, and

restore possession of the Property to the Plaintiff, DFI Properties, LLC within three (3)
calendar days following service of this Order, or be forcibly removed by the sheriff or
constable.
2.

Defendants have the right to a hearing to contest the manner of the

enforcement of this Order of Restitution pursuant to the form to request a hearing served
concurrently with this Order.
3.

If Defendants fail to comply with this Order within the time prescribed

. herein, the sheriff or constable may enter the Property by force using the least destructive
means possible to remove the Defendants.
4.

Any personal property of the Defendants may be removed from the

Property by the sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location for safe storage.
DATED this

day of December, 2008.
BY THE COURT

Judge David N. Mortensen
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CALLISTERNEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
Carolyn Montgomery (2297)
Thomas B. Price (8254)
Zions Bank Building
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127
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WOODALL & WASSERMANN
James H. Woodall (5361)
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Telephone: (801) 254-9450
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
DFI PROPERTIES, LLC, a California Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER OF RESTITUTION
Civil No. 080103867
Judge David N. Mortensen

GR 2 ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Defendants.

On December

Judgment was entered by this Court against

Defendants GR 2 Enterprises, LLC and Does 1 through 10, ordering that GR 2
Enterprises, LLC and Does 1 through 10, within three (3) calendar days following
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service of this Order, vacate and deliver possession of the real property located at 480
West 870 South, Orem, Utah (the "Property"), and more particularly described as:
All of Lot 1, Plat "C", including a vacation of Lots 3 & 4, Plat "B",
Jensen Cove Subdivision, according to the official plat thereof on
file in the Office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendants shall vacate the Property, remove all personal property, and

restore possession of the Property to the Plaintiff, DFI Properties, LLC within three (3)
calendar days following service of this Order, or be forcibly removed by the sheriff or
constable.
2.

Defendants have the right to a hearing to contest the manner of the

enforcement of this Order of Restitution pursuant to the form to request a hearing served
concurrently with this Order,
3«

If Defendants fail to comply with this Order within the time prescribed

herein, the sheriff or constable may enter the Property by force using the least destructive
means possible to remove the Defendants.
4.

Any personal property of the Defendants may be removed from the

Property by die sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location for safe storage.
DATED this

of December, 2008.

Judge ^Bavid N. MdijenseEr
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Name
Address
City, State ZIP
Telephone
IN THE

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

•

>

Plaintiff,

)

REQUEST FOR HEARING

>

Case No.

v.
• >

J

Defendant.

I object to the terms of the Order of Restitution or the manner in which the Order of Restitution was enforced
for the following reasons (check all that apply):
[ ]
I was not personally;*served with a copy of the Order of Restitution, nor was a copy of the Order of
Restitution mailed to me and posted on the premises.
<
[ ]
I was not given the time period ordered by the court to voluntarily vacate the premises,
[ ]
My properly is not being stored in a suitable place and/oir in a reasonable manner.
[ ]
The removal and storage costs charged to me are unreasonable.
[ ]
I was not provided with a copy of the inventory of the property- removed.
[ ]
Although I demanded return of my property within 30 days of the date it was removed, and although I
paid all costs associated with its removal and storage, my property was not returned.
[ ]
A written notice of the time and place of sale of my property was not mailed to me.
{ ]
I attended the sale of my property. However, the remainder of my property was not released to me
after the costs of removal, storage, advertising and conducting the sale were recovered.
[ ]
I did not attend the sale of my property. The remaining proceedis of the sale were not returned to me
after deducting the costs of removal, storage, advertising and conducting the sale and paying plaintiff"s
judgment against me.
[ ]
I am not the defendant. I delivered a written demand for the release of my property to the constable
or sheriff, and provided proper identification and evidence of ownership, but my property was not returned.
[ ]
Other:

The statements made in this Request For Hearing are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
I mailed or delivered a copy of this Request For Hearing to: [ ] Plaintiff [ ] Defendant.

DATE:

SIGNATURE:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

0214

ADDENDUM 3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

First Federal District Coi
Western Region, 'Nato Indian Nation

P.OBox141

BIC 0 8 ?nnff

Manti, Utah 84642
Office: (801) 808-1497
E-mail: ChiefJustice@natoindiannation.com

OF JUSTICE
^M

IN THE FIRST FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN REGION

1
4 <A

%

"1^

CO

S&
PETITION FOR HEARING TO &JQW .
CAUSE, STAY OF PROCEEDINGS ANQP|
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ,

IN RE,
Juan Antonio Granados
v.

Case No.

DFI Funding, Inc. and
DFI Properties, LLC

Presiding: Judge Henry Clayton

COMES NOW, the Petitioner Juan Antonio Granados, a Kickapoo indigenous
person and citizen of 'Nato Indian Nation, by and through the FIRST FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT WESTERN REGION, by this Petition requests a hearing before the
court to Show Cause and why Declaratory Relief of pending action in the 4th District
Court in the State of Utah Civil No. 080103867 and pending action in the Superior Court]
of California, County of Ventura/Limited Civil, Case No. 56-2008-000331977CL-VDVDA, should not be granted and any or all other relief as seems proper and necessary
for issues to be presented before the court,
BY THE PETITIONER:
Dated this 8th day of December, 2008
5lian/
an Antonio Granados, Petitioner

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The undersigned hereby rtifies that they caused a true and' rect copy of the
foregoing PETITION FOR HEARING TO SHOW CAUSE, STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
AND FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF to be delivered to the following:

NAME

ADDRESS

4th District Court of Utah
Superior Court of California, County of Ventura/Limited Civil
Kimball, Tirey and St. John

350 S. Figueroa, Suite 498
Los Angeles, CA 90071

Mr. Thomas B. Price, Esq.
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough

10 E . S . Temple #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84113

James H. Woodall
Woodall & Wassermann

10653 River Front Pkwy, Suite 290
South Jordan, UT 84095

Mr. Randall L. Jeffs

90 N. 100 E.
P.O Box 888
Provo, UT 84603

Dated

£tec- &- a§
Juan Antonio Granados, Petitioner
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First Federal District Cor
Western Region, 'Nato Indian Nation
P.O Box 141
Manti, Utah 84642
Office: (801) 808-1497
E-mail: ChiefJustice@natoindiannation.com

r- s

0tt 0 8 2008
.A

5

?8P!ir

IN THE FIRST FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
<2>

6

WESTERN REGION
-&

7
8

-£^\
IN RE,

9

Juan Antonio Granados,

10

Petitioner

11

*cP

ORDER FOR HEARINGS'
TO SHOW CAUSE
'

Y

;>->
-*y o

v.
Case No. UT081208CIVIL

12

DFI Funding, Inc. and

13

DFI Properties, LLC
Presiding: Judge Henry Clayton

14

Defendants

15
16
17

COMES NOW, the FIRST FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN REGION,
having received Petition and evidence, finds that Petitioner, having authority under color]

18 of tribal custom/law, Federal Indian Law and International Rights of Indigenous Peoples,)
19

is certified though comity, reciprocity and superior jurisdiction (Indian Law is Federal

20

Law) able to bring this cause of action before the court, therefore this court has proper

21

venue and jurisdiction.

22
23

Said entitled case to be heard before the Honorable Henry Clayton Presiding
Judge on the 16th of December 2008 at a time and place to be determined.

24

BY THE COURT:

25

Dated jmis 8th & w of December, 2008
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The undersigned hereby^ rtifies that they caused a true and ('•• rect copy of the
foregoing ORDER FOR HEARING TO SHOW CAUSE to be delivered to the following:

ADDRESS

NAME
4th District Court of Utah

Superior Court of California, County of Ventura/Limited Civil
Kimball, Tirey and St. John

350 S. Figueroa, Suite 498
Los Angeles, CA 90071

Mr. Thomas B. Price, Esq.
Callister, Nebeker & McCu Hough

10 E. S. Temple #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84113

James H. Woodall
Woodall & Wassermann

10653 River Front Pkwy, Suite 290
South Jordan, UT 84095

Mr. Randall L. Jeffs

90 N. 100 E.
P.OBox888
Provo, UT 84603

Dated ; jTgc_ ff- 6ff

Q

fuuan Antonio Granados, Petitioner
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TIED

First Federal District Co(
Western Region, 'Nato Indian Nation
P.O Box 141
Manti, Utah 84642
Office: (801) 808-1497
E-mail: ChiefJustice@natoindiannation.com

m

0 6 ?0d8

*t&£p Indian Nation
"-: :\€1*

IN THE FIRST FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
d\

WESTERN REGION

V77*

ST

y
ORDER TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS

IN RE,

MS-

Juan Antonio Granados
Case No. UT081208CIVIL

v.
DFI Funding, Inc. and
DFI Properties, LLC

Presiding: Judge Henry Clayton

COMES NOW, the FIRST FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN REGION,
having received Petition and evidence and having authority under color of tribal
custom/law, Federal Indian Law and International Rights of Indigenous Peoples, is
certified though comity, reciprocity and superior jurisdiction (Indian Law is Federal Law)
able to bring this cause of action before the court, therefore this court has proper venue
and jurisdiction of pending action in the 4th District Court in the State of Utah Civil No.
080103867 and pending action in the Superior Court of California, County of
Ventura/Limited Civil, Case No. 56-2008-000331977CL-VD-VDA.

The court hereby, grants to Petitioner a TEMPORARY STAY of pending actions
in the before mentioned styled cases in order to seek equitable remedy as is provided
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' 1 for within tribal custom/lr

Federal Indian Law and Internatio'

' Indigenous Rights

I

2
3

Law.
Tribal courts are traditionally non-adversarial in nature and practice, while

4

maintaining an atmosphere of equity between all parties involved in disputes between

5

Indian to Indian while at the same time have continuously become more concentrated in(

6

disputes with Indian to non-Indian over property and the jurisdiction involved with the

7

possession of same-

8

Traditionally tribal courts have lacked the funding to exercise tribal legal matters

9

that extend beyond their natural borders. In the past fifteen years such has not been

10

the case with the exercise of the First Federal District Court provided by 'Nato Indian

11

Nation to various other tribal nations in Canada, the United States and Mexico.

12

In 1994 Congress passed Public Law 103-263, section 5(b), paragraphs (f) and

13

(g) referred to as the "Privileges and Immunities of Indian Tribes; Prohibition on New

14

Regulations" and "Privileges and immunities of Indian Tribes; Existing Regulations".

15

These regulations prohibited the misuse of Congressional, Departmental or Regulatory

16

powers to classify, enhance, or diminish the privileges or immunities of the various

17 tribes by Government or by other tribes relative to each other.
18

Further, basic Federal Indian law constructs have been adopted to protect the

19

sovereign immunity of indigenous peoples and have been in place for decades. For

20

example, "Law doctrines from other fields of law cannot be imposed upon Indian law,

21

legal doctrines must often be viewed from a different perspective from that which would

22

obtain m other areas of law"; "Standard principles of statutory construction do not have

23

their usual force in cases involving Indian law", and more importantly "State law

24

definition of terms cannot be used to frustrate statues".

25

While the basic constructs provide a guide there are more specific case history to|
provide legal footprints relating to jurisdiction. For instance, in Alberty v. United States,
the object of the ruling pertained to the meaning of the words "sole" or only "parties",
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m

',1 obviously there were vaf

s ways to interpret the definition. ''

i court ruled that

2

Congresses intent was to exclude white men and persons of other nations (Indian) with

3

respect to civil litigation as "the more probable construction".

4

Further, in Lower Brule v. Sheesley's Plumbing & Heating Co. Inc., the court

5

decided that "Tribal courts are primary and exclusive forum for disputes regarding tribal

6

government issues and for interpretation of tribal laws", and in Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante,

7

Mont/Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, "Tribal courts can also be the forum for civil

8

disputes even between Indians and non-Indians".

9

Now, as pertaining to the State courts and Indian courts, Indian courts have a

10

long established history as to their status to bring individual members or citizens of their

11

nation before a traditional form of remedy. In the case of Pittsburgh & Midway Coal

12

Mining Co. v. Watchman, "Tribal courts remedies must be exhausted before issue may

13

be considered by federal court". Such a ruling places the burden of resolution squarely

14 with Indian court jurisdiction.
15

Most recently, these issues have come before the body of the United Nations in

16

relation to Indigenous Rights. The 'United Nations Declaration on the Rights of

17

indigenous Peoples" was passed last September 12th 2007. The issues heretofore

18

delineated can be found in the following sections of this document as approved in

19

General Session:

20

Article 8 Section 2 paragraphs (a) and (b); Article 9; Article 10; Article 13 Section 2;

21

Article 18; Article 20 Section 2; Article 26 Sections 1, 2, and 3; Article 27; Article 28;

22

Article 29 Section 1; Article 33 Section 1 and 2; Article 34; Article 40; Article 42; and last)

23

but not least Article 43.

24
25

With these structures kept in mind the First Federal District Courts jurisdiction is
well established and has the expectation of the exercise of comity, reciprocity arid
exclusive jurisdiction over these issues to be respected by the courts, attorneys and
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• 1 plaintiffs who should be (

jer to find a simple and-equitable r

)lution, as time is of the]

essence.

4

BY THE COURT:

5

Datei

his 8th day

r, 2008

6
Judcje Henry Clayton
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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The undersigned hereby
rtifies that they caused a true and! :rect copy of the
foregoing ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS to be delivered to the following:

NAME

ADDRESS

m
4«th
District Court of Utah

Superior Court of California, County of Ventura/Limited Civil
Kimball, Tirey and St. John

350 S. Figueroa, Suite 498
Los Angeles, CA 90071

Mr. Thomas B. Price, Esq.
Callister, Nebeker & McCullough

10 E. S. Temple #900
Salt Lake City, UT 84113

James H. Woodall
Woodall & Wassermann

10653 River Front Pkwy, Suite 290
South Jordan, UT 84095

Mr. Randall L. Jeffs

90 N. 100 E.
P.O Box 888
Provo, UT 84603

Dated: £gC-ff-6£

J

JC h I *Q •
±& . A r i t */ *&m '&-S
|&U£&.
Juan Antonio Granados, Petitioner
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Robert Fugal (3796)
BIRD & FUGAL
Attorneys for Debtors
384E.720S.#201
Orem,UT 84058
(801)426-4700
* * * * * * *

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

* * * * * * *
IN RE
Case No. 08-24417 JAB
Chapter 7
GR 2 Enterprises, LLC,
DECLARATION OF JUAN
ANTONIO GRANADOS, SR.
Debtor

* * * * * * *
I, Juan Antonio Granados, Sr., make the following declaration under penalty of
perjury based oh my personal knowledge: .
1. I am a member manager of GR 2 Enterprises, LLC.
2. in 1986, my wife, Rosalia Granados, and I purchased a 27 acre farm in
Fillmore California. There we worked the land and raised our family. I also worked as a
Crane operator.
3. The farm is improved with 2 residences, one at 1729 Muir Street and the other at 1021 Oak Avenue, Fillmore, CA 93015.
4. In 2004, because our children had grown, and many of them lived in Utah
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Valley, we decided to sell our farm and move to Utah. In 2004 we had an offer on the
property, which failed to close and resulted in litigation, which was resolved favorably to
us. In 2006, we received an acceptable offer on our farm property, so we released the
prior buyer from their obligation and entered into a contract to sell it to a new buyer for
$3,300,000.00. At that time we owed approximately $625,000.00 on a first mortgage
and $213,000 on some other liens incurred in connection with the litigation. The buyer
wanted to develop the property and requested that we remove our fruit trees, which we
did. We looked for a house in Utah Valley and found one to our liking at 480 W. 870 S.,
Orem, UT 84097. The buyer delayed closing on the purchase of our farm property in
California. We wanted to buy the Orern property, but did not have the funds to do so
until we got money from our California farm. The sellers of the Orem home were very
motivated and were offering it at a reduced price of $673,000.00. We considered that
price to be an exceptionally good offer that we wanted to accept
5. To avoid losing the purchase of the Orem house to other buyers, we sought
for a loan against our California farm so we could buy the house in Orem. A friend
Introduced me to a loan officer, Richard Hernandez, who said he could arrange such
financing with DFI Properties, LLC f DFI" herein).
6. Through the course of many discussions with Mr. Hernandez and
representatives of DFI, we agreed to borrow enough money, secured by the California
farm, to enable us to pay cash for the Orem house. Because there was more than
enough equity in the farm, the loan was to be secured only by the farm. DFI had their
own appraisers value the farm property. DFi's appraisal showed that the property was
worth $2,800,000.00, a conservative valuation given that we had a pending offer at
2
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$3,300,000.00.
7. In connection with ourfirstattempted sale of the farm property, we created
G R 2 Enterprise, LLC, ("GR T herein) to handle our real estate transactions. My wife
and! each own 50% of the membership interest of G R 2. Based on the pending sale of
the farm property for $3,300,000.00, we transferred our farm property to GR 2 about
May 11,2006.
8. The amount of money needed to purchase the Orem house and pay off the
existing debt on the farm was approximately $1,511,876.90. I advised Mr. Hernandez
that f did not have sufficient income to make payments on such a loan and requested
that the loan amount include sufficient money to make the payments on the loan for a
year, an amount of time that I believed to be more than enough for the sale of the farm
to dose and pay off the proposed loan. They agreed to provide a years worth of
payments in the loan. On behalf of GR 2,1 agreed to borrow $1,775,000.00, which was
represented to me to be the amount necessary to pay off the underlying debt on the
farm and pay for the Orem house and make the payments on the new loan for a year.
The proposed term of the new loan was to be 3 years with monthly payments of interest
only. The excess loan proceeds were to be placed in a trust account from which the
monthly payments would be made as they came due. The interest rate was not agreed
to, nor were late penalties and origination fees. Movant's representatives said .that after
the loan closed I would be given a check for sufficient money to purchase the Orem
residence. They never provided me with a good faith estimate of the loan costs.
9. During the application and negotiation.process, Mr. Hernandez repeatedly •
passed on to me reassurances from DFI representatives saying not to worry, because
3
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they were taking care of everything.
10. At the time of making the loan application, Mr. Hernandez instructed me to
sign the application in blank and said he would fill in the blanks, which he did/
11. While I was conducting business in Utah, I received a phone call from Mr.
Hernandez informing me that the loan was ready to close and that I should come
immediately to California to sign the documents. I arrived at the closing office at about
10 minutes prior to their close of business. The dosing agent directed me to a large
stack of documents and instructed me to hurry and sign them because they were
closing in 10 minutes. Without my knowledge and contrary to our agreements on the
subject, one of the documents they had me sign was a deed of trust on the Orem
house. Also, the terms of the promissory note they had me sign, especially the interest
rate and default provisions had never been agreed upon. The origination fees had
never been agreed upon. Because I was hurried by the dosing agent, I did not notice
these things while I was signing.
12.1 did not get a copy of the closing documents until about 4 days after the
closing. It was only then when I discovered that they had me sign a deed of trust on the
Orem residence. It was only then when I discovered that they had provided for high
interest rate, unreasonable penalties and excessive origination fees. It was only then
when I saw that they had provided a fund for only 8 months worth of payments. When I
questioned Mr. Hernandez about the reduction to 8 months, he said that would be
enough because the buyers of the farm property were ready to close. I supposed that it
was too late to have the documents corrected to conform to pur agreement Movant did
not send me the money to buy the Utah house, but instead sent the check directly to
4
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the sellers.
13. Ultimately; the purchasers of my farm property failed to close. I heard that
someone had advised them that they were paying too much for the property.
14. After the sale failed, I put the farm property back on the market. I did not get
new acceptable offers. Eventually the trust fund for the interest payments ran out, 3
months earlier than had been represented to me. I marshaled my resources and made
1 payment in addition to the ones that were made from the trust fund. DFI failed to pay
me interest on the money they had in the trust fund.
15. Subsequently, I obtained offers of long term financing on the Orem home
which would enable me to easily refinance the balance on the farm property. I
proposed the payoffs to DFI. DFI repeatedly refused to allow me to refinance the Orem
home and the farm property separately even though the Orem home was not supposed
to be collateral for the loan. Instead, DFI proceeded to foreclosure..
16. A friend introduced me to some people who said they could help me
preserve our equity in our properties. They filled out papers which they had me sign
giving them fractional interests in the properties, in exchange for which they were to
advance me three installments of $45,000 each. The money they committed to provide
was to enable me to reinstate the loan and hold off the foreclosure. They failed to
provide the money and filed bankruptcies, using what the California courts said were
improper means to try to hold off the foreclosure.
17. Subsequently, they have disappeared and have failed to return my phone
calls.
18. \ never received any papers from the California Bankruptcy Courts regarding
5
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the California Bankruptcy cases of the individuals involved in Capistrano Enterprises,
Carpenter Group, and Marengo Associates. I did not know their methods were
improper. I did not know that they had no ability nor intention to pay me the $45,000.00
payments they committed to do.
August 15f 2008
/s/ Juan Antionio Granados

6
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served via ECF or caused to be mailed a correct copy of
the foregoing document via first-ciass mail, postage prepaid, on the 15th day of August,
2008, to the following:
US Trustee

ECF

Philip G . Jones
Chapter 7 Trustee

ECF

• James H. Woodail
10653 River Front Parkway, Suite 290
South Jordan, UT 84095
GR 2 Enterprises, LLC
480 West 870 South
Orem.UT 84058

/s/ Candace-Simrhonds
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Attorney or Party Nams, Addtces. Telephone A Fax Numbers, and California Stale Bar Number

J A M E S J A Y STOFFEL, S 8 N . 083947
B E 8 £ R M A N S T O f PEL & B E B E R M A N

K«coOr<pfgE0ii« ENTERED

7676 HAZARD CENTER DRIVE, STE, 500
SAN DIEGO, CA 92108
619-297-4800 (T) / 619-297^807 (F)
jstoffel@bsbtew.org

MAY 27 2008
CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
Centraf District or California
BY may
DEPUTY C U R K

H I Individual Qppearing without counsel
XX AttorneyforAfovartf
UNITED S T A T E S B A N K R U P T C Y C O U R T
C E N T R A L DISTRICT O F CALIFORNIA

In re;

CHAPTER: 13.

S A M U E L ANDREWS DBA C A R P E N T E R G R O U P
CASENO.:2:08-11370-M

Dobtor($).

DATE: 5/21/06
TIME: 11:30 A M .
CTRM: 1375
FLOOR: 13 TH

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY
UNDER 11 US.C. § 362 (Real Property)
(MOVANT: DPI PROPERTIES, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LLC )
D Contested

Uncontested

1.

The Motion was:

2.

The Motfon affects the following real property fProperty*):

Q

Settled by Stipulation

Street Address:
BKOPERTY KO, X : 48$ WB$T 3BO SOOTH, OREH, OTAR 8405B
ApwtmentfSuite N<x: FKOJ?ERTY NO. 2 : i7«o MUIR STFEBT A»D iQ2* OAK AVENOS, FILHORE. CA 93015
Oiy, State, Zip Code:
Legal description or document recording number (including county of recording):
PROPERTY NO. 1 : WAfl 6ftOI>£H¥Y - UTAH COUNTY
rnWKKTY HC. 2 : CALIFORNIA PROPERTY - VENTURA COUtfTY
[Xl See attached page. USSM. uescftm-ioNS ATTACHED AS ATTACHMENT A AND ATTACKKsmr a.

3.

The Motionfegranted under:

Q 11 U.&.C. § 362(d)(1)
jg] 11USwC.§ 362(d)(4)

Q

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)

D

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)

4.

As to Movant, its successors, transferees and assigns ("Movant"), the stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is;
a. (El Terminated astoDebtors) and Debtors*) bankruptcy estate.
&. C I Annulled retroactively to the date of the bankruptcy petition filing.
c. O Modified or condiUoned as set forth In Exhibit
to this Order.

5.

S3 Movant may enforce its remedies to foreclose upon and obtain possession of the Property in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcytew,but may not pursue any deficiency claim against the Debtors) or property of the estate except by Wing a Proof
of Claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501.
(TNs Ortfer is coniimmf on next page)
This form is mandatory by Order of tbo UniiwJ States Bankruptcy Court for tho Central District of California.
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in

CHAPTER 13

TO.

SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP
Debtors).

S,

CASE NUMBER O8-11370-AA-13

C ] Movant shall not conduct a foreclosure sale before the following date (specify):
The stay shall remain in effect subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Adequate Protection Attachment to this
Order.

8.

Q

In chapter 13 cases, the trustee shall not make any further payments on account of Movant's secured claim after entry of this
Order. The secured portion of Movant's claim is deemed withdrawn upon entry of this Order without prejudice to Movants
right to file an amended unsecured claim for any deficiency. Absent a stipulation or order to the contrary, Movant shall return
to the trustee any payments received from the trustee on account of Movant's secured claim after entry of this Order.

9,

E3

Tn

& ^ " 9 of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder and defraud creditors that Involved either;

0 3 transfer of all or part ownership of. or other interest in, the Property without the consent of the secured creditor or court
approval.
(A} multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the Property.
if recorded in compliance with applicable state laws governing notices Of interest or liens m the Property, this Order Is binding and
effective under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)4(A) and (B) in any ether bankruptcy case purporting to affect the Property filed not later than
two (2) years after the date of entry of this Order, except that a debtor in a subsequent bankruptcy case may move for relief from
this Order based upon changed circumstances or for good cause shown, after notice and a hearing. Any federal, state or local
governmental unit that accepts notices of interests or liens in real property shall accept a certified copy of this Order for indexing
and recording.
1D. This Court further orders as follows:
a.

[ 3 This Order shall be binding and effective despite any conversion of thi$ bankruptcy case to a case under any other
chapter of Title 11 of the United States Code.

b.

£ 3 The 10-day stay provided by Bankruptcy Rule 40G1 (a)(3) is waived,

a
a

§3 The provisions set form in the Extraordinary Relief Attachment shall also apply (attach Optional Fom f 4QQ1-W-GR).
IS See attached continuation page for additional provisions,
LEGAL DESCRiprioNS OP PRODEBTY
ATTACHMENT A - UTAH PHQPiSjm
ATTACHMENT a - CALIFORNIA PSOP^RTV

D A T E D : May 27,2008
United Stales Bankruptcy judge

This form is mandatory by Order of the United Stales Bankruptcy Court for tfte Central District of California.
Revised July 2007
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CHAPTER 13

In re:
SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP
Debtor(s).

CASE NUMBER 08-11370-AA-13

(OPTIONAL)
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF ATirACHMENT
(MOVANT: PFl PROPERTIES. LLC. A CALIFORNIA LLC)
(This Attachment is the continuation page for Paragraph 10c of the foregoing Order.)
Based upon evidence of efforts by Debtor(s) or others acting in concert with Debtor(s) to delay, hinder or defraud Movant
by abusive bankruptcy filings, this court further orders as follows:
1.

•

2.

n This Order is binding m6 effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against any successors,
transferees, or assignees of the above-named Debtor(s) for a period of 180 days from the hearing of the Motion.
•
without further notice.
•
upon recording of a copy of this Order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.

3.

•
•
•

This Order is binding and effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against the Debtor(s) for a period of
180 days from the hearing of the Motion.

This Order is binding and effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against any debtor(s) who daim{s)
any interest in the Property for a period of 180 days from the hearing of the Motion.
without further notice.
upon recording of a copy of this Order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable nonbankruptcy law,

4.

•
•
•

This Order is binding and effective in any future bankruptcy case, no matter who the debtor(s) may be
without further notice.
upon recording of a copy of this Order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.

5.

•

The Debtor(s) is/are hereby enjoined from transferring all or any portion of the Property for a period of 180 days
from the hearing of the Motion except as may be authorized by further order of this Court, and any transfer in
violation of this Order is void.

6.

Q The Sheriff or Marsha! may evict the Debtor(s) and any other occupant from the subject Property regardless of
any future bankruptcy filing concerning the Property for a period of 180 days from the hearing of the Motion.
•
without further notice.
•
upon recording of a copy of this Order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable nonbankruptcy law.

7.

£3 Other (specify): That this order be binding and effective in any other case under the Bankruptcy Code purporting
to affect the subject real property filed not later than two years after the date of entry, upon recording a copy of the
order or giving appropriate notice of its entry in compliance with applicable non-bankruptcy law, except that a debtor in
subsequent case may move for relief from the order based upon good cause shown after notice and hearing.

This form is mandatory by Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
Revised July 2007
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tare:
SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP
Debtor($)-

CASE NUMBER 08-11370-AA-13

ATTACHMENT A

All of Lot I, Plat "C", including a vacation of Lots 3&4, plat "B", JENSEN COVE SUBDIVISION, Orem,
Utah, according to the official plat thereof onfilein the office of the Recorder of Utah County, Utah.
Tax Serial No. 43:066:0001

This form is mandatory by Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Centrai District of California.
Revised July 2007
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In re:
SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP

CHAPTER 13
Debtors). CASE NUMBER 0e-11370-AA-13

ATTACHMENT B

The land referred to is situated in the unincorporated area of the County of Ventura, State of California, and is
described as follows;
Parcel 1:
Lots 90 and 91 of the Fillmore Subdivision of the Sespe Rancho, in ithe County of Venture, State of California,
as per Map recorded in Book 3, Page 5 of Maps, in the office of the County Recorder of said County, together
with that portion of the Southerly one-half of Muir Street, abandoned
Except all of the oil, gas and mineral substances lying in or under said land, without, however the right to enter
upon the surface thereof or within 500 feet of the surface thereof for the purpose of drilling or extracting same,
as reserved in Grant Deed recorded April 11, 1986, as Instrument No. 86-042944, Official Records.
Parcel 2:
Part of Farm Lots 88 and 89 of the Fillmore Subdivision of the Sespe Rancho, in the County of Ventura, State
of California,, as per Map recorded in Book 3, Page 5 of Maps, in the office of the County Recorder of said
County, more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a % inch iron steel bar set at the most Westerly corner of said Farm Lot 88; thence along line No.
78 of the Final Survey of the Rancho Sespe;
1st: North 32°30' East 753.65 feet to a Y* inch steel bar set at the point of intersection of said Line No. 78 with
the South line of Muir Street; thence along said South line,
2nd: South 79°56'30" East 105.01 feet to a 54 inch iron pipe set in the Northeasterly line of said Farm Lot 89;
thence along said line,
3rd: South 47°04'30" East 528.12 feet to a 1 inch iron pipe; thence,
4th: South 16°47' East 256.66 feet to a % inch iron pipe; thence,
5th: South 8°06' West 90.11 feet to a 3/4 inch iron pipe; thence,
6th: North 87°29'30" West 124.96 feet to a % inch iron pipe; thence,
7th: South 15°19' West 175.49 feet to a Vi inchironpipe; thence,
8th: South 29°40'30" West 312,11 feet to a Vi inch iron pipe; thence,
(continued on page 7)
This fomi is mandatory by Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
Revised July 2007

F4001-10.RP
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CHAPTER 13

Debtors).

CASE NUMBER Q8-11370-AA-13

(continued from page 6)

9th: North 42*50' West 428.96 feet to a % inch iron pipe; thence,
10th: North 69°04' West 222.22 feet to a % inch iron pipe; thence,
11th: North 48°16'30" West 177.19 feet to the point of beginning together with that portion of the Southerly
one-half of Muir Street, abandoned.
Except all of the oil, gas and mineral substances lying in or under said land, without, however the right to enter
upon the surface thereof of within 500 feet of the surface thereof, for the purpose of drilling or extracting the
same as reserved in Grant Deed recorded April 11, 1986, as Instrument No. 86-042944, Official Records.
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CHAPTER 13

In re:

SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP
Debtor(s).

CASE NUMBER 08-11370-AA-13

PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
l( Jonathan Freyt hereby declare:
I am employed in the County of San Diego, California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the
within action. My business address is 7676 Hazard Center Drive, Suite 500f San Diego, California, 92108. I am
personally and readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing
with the United States Postal Service, pursuant to which mail placed for collection at designated stations in the
ordinary course of business is deposited the same day, proper postage prepaid, with the United States Postal
Service,
On May 23, 2008,1 served: [PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC
STAY on the parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof, on the above date, enclosed in a sealed envelope,
following the ordinary business practice, for collection and mailing in the United States mail addressed as follows:
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the United States of America that
the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on May 23, 2008, at San Diego, California.

fs,l Jonathan Frev

This form is mandatory by Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. •
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In re:

CHAPTER 13

SAMEUEL ANDREWS DBA CARPENTER GROUP
Debtors),

CASE NUMBER 08-11370-AA-13

SERVICE LIST
DEBTOR:
Samuel Andrews
Dba Carpenter Group
6300 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90048
DEBTOR'S AFFILIATE:
Gary Barnette
Dba Marengo Associates
23545 Crenshaw Blvd.
Torrance, CA 90505
ORIGINAL BORROWER:
Juan A. Granados, Manager
GR2 Enterprises, LLC
580 West 870 South
Orem.UT 84058
CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE:
KathyADockery
700 S. Flower Street, Suite 1950
Los Angeles, CA 90017
OFFICE OF THE US TRUSTEE:
United States Trustee
725 S. Figueroa Street, 26th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017

!
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CLERK US, BANKRUPTCY COURT Central District of California
BY gooch DEPUTY CLERK

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In re:

CaseNo:LA-08-11972AA

Gary Barnette dba Marengo Associates,

CaseNo:LA-08-11370AA

Chapter 13
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Debtors).

Date:
Time:
Location:

In re:

Samuel Andrews dba Carpenter Group,

June 19,2008
10:30 a.m.
255 E. Temple Street
Courtroom 1375
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Debtors).

The Court invokes its power under i 1 U.S.C. § 105(a), to cany out the provisions in 11 ULS.C. §
362 and to prevent an abuse of process, and issues this order to show cause ("OSC"). This OSC is in
response to the numerous transfers offractionalinterests in real properties to entities, which thenfilefor
bankruptcy, solely to invoke the protection of the automatic stay. The cases where such a scheme has
taken place are:

-l
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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•

LA 08-11972 AA, Gary Bamette dba Marengo Associates, Ch 13,filed2/15/08, pending

•

LA 08-11370 AA, Samuel Andrews dba Carpenter Group, Ch 13,filed2/1/08, pending

•

LA 07-20557 AA, Jeny Baltare dba Concourse Group, Ch 13, filed 11 /l 5/07, dismissed on
12/20/07

•

LA 08-12532 AA, Daniel Davies dba Stevenson Affiliates, Ch 13,filed2/28/08, dismissed
on 5/2/08

•

LA 07-11481 AA, Carol Miller dba Compton Affiliates, Ch 13,filed2/26/07, dismissed on
11/9/07

•

LA 07-15591 AA, Samuel Jester dba Imperial Enterprises and Imperial Investments, filed
7/3/07, dismissed on 8/6/07

•

LA 07-17741 AA, Thomas Garton dba Fountain Enterprises, Ch 13,filed9/4/07, dismissed
on 10/3/07

•

LA 07-18777 AA, Steven Jonkins dba Oceanside Associates, Ch 13, filed 10/3/07, dismissed
on 10/29/07

•

LA 08-10838 AA, Norman Perkon dba Empire Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 1/22/08, dismissed
on 2/15/08

•

LA 07-22106 AA, Bany Stantol dba Mercer Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 12/26/07, dismissed on
4/8/08

•

LA 08-10239 AA, Button Wolke dba Thorton Group, Ch 13,filed1/7/08, dismissed on
2/4/08

•

LA 07-21533 AA, Randy Cartere dba Portland Associates, Ch 13, filed 12/10/07, dismissed
on 3/11/08

•

LA 07-10020 AA, Gary Alan Green dba Saturn Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 1/3/07, dismissed
on 6/7/07

0075
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

LA 07-15050 AA, Victor Starker dba Catalina Enterprises, Ch 13,filed6/18/07, dismissed
on 7/25/07

•

LA 07-17008 AA, Barry E. Woodsy dba Cromwell Group, Ch 13,filed8/14/07, dismissed
on 9/14/07

•

LA 08-13298 VK, Peter Edgewood dba Capistrano Enterprises, Ch 13,filed3/14/08,
dismissed on 4/14/08

•

LA 07-12750 AA, Thomas Vermont dba Olympic West Group, Ch 13,filed4/4/07,
dismissed on 5/4/07

•

LA 07-13506 AA, William Parson dba Alameda Enterprises, Ch 13,filed4/30/07, dismissed
on 5/31/07

•

LA 07-14438 AA, Grant Wilson dba Broadway Holdings, Ch 13,filed5/30/07, dismissed on
7/6/07

•

LA 07-14731 EC, Lucio Alejandro Gonzales dba Opel Funding, Ch 13,filed6/7/07,
dismissed on 8/6/07, reopened 3/27/08

•

LA 07-17930 AA, Ike Nathaniel King dba Ink Holdings, Ch 13,filed9/10/07, dismissed
12/19/07

•

LA 07-19717 AA, George Falkner dba Carnival Enterprises, Ch 13, filed 10/26/07, dismissed
on 12/3/07

•

LA 08-13990 VZ, John Portero dba Almaden Group, Ch 13,filed3/27/08, dismissed on
6/10/08

•

LA 08-13298 VK, Peter Edgewood dba Capistrano Enterprises, filed 3/14/08, dismissed on
4/14/08

•

LA 07-16270 AA, Arthur Lamb dba Lexington Enterprises, Ch 13,filed7/24/07, dismissed
on 12/12/07

-3
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1

•

2

LA 07-13539 AA, Phillip Baker dba Redondo Enterprises, Ch 13,filed5/1/07, dismissed on
6/7/07

3
4

•

5/19/08

5
6

•

7
8

LA 07-12784 AA, George Bledsoe dba Mercury Affiliates, Ch 13,filed4/5/07, dismissed on

LA 07-12107 AA, Terry Larson dba Bayside Group, Ch 13, filed 3/15/07, dismissed on
5/4/07

•

LA 07-10523 AA, Greg Este dba Venice Affiliates, Ch 13, filed 1/23/07, dismissed on

9
3/14/07, reopened on 4/1/08

10
11
12

.13

•

LA 07-10235 AA, Calvin Johnson dba Rockwell Group, Ch 13, filed 1/11/07, dismissed on
3/1/07

All of the above cases share similar facts. The debtors in the above cases never appeared in their

14

15
16
17

18
19

cases. Together, over a hundred motions for relieffromthe automatic stay have beenfiledin these
cases. As of June 11,2008, 33 motions for relieffromthe automatic stay were filed in the Bamette case,
and 69 motions for relief from the automatic stay werefiledin the Andrews case.
The borrowers transferred afractionalinterest in their properties to an individual with a fictitious
business name, who then filed for bankruptcy.

20

Fractional interests in the same property were transferred to multiple debtors listed above.
21
22
23
24

25
26

For example, Janice McClinton transferred the following interests in her property located at 5458
Cambria Drive, Mira Loma, California:
1. an undivided 1/8 interest to Capistrano Enterprises on March 17,2008;
2. an undivided 1/8 interest to Concourse Group on December 4,2007;
3. an undivided 1/8 interest to Empire Enterprises on January 18,2008; and

27
28

4. an undivided 1/8 interest to Marengo Associates on February 20,2008, post petition.

-4
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In another example, Karen Tisdale transferred the following interests in her property located at
4744-4746 Cape May Avenue, San Diego, California:
1. an undivided 1/8 interest to Alameda Enterprises on August 25, 2006;
2. an undivided 1/8 interest to Almaden Group on October 27,2007;
3. an undivided 1/8 interest to Broadway Holdings on August 25, 2006;
4. an undivided 1/8 interest to Carnaval Enterprises on December 22,2006;
5. an undivided 1/8 interest to Carpenter Group on February 11, 2008;
6. an undivided 1/8 interest to Cromwell Group on December 22, 2006;
7. an undivided 1/8 interest to Empire Enterprises on July 22,2007;
8. an undivided 1/8 interest to Fountain Enterprises on December 22,2006;
9. an undivided 1/8 interest to Hazan Holding Co on May 10,2007;
10. an undivided 1/8 interest to Marengo Associates on September 15, 2007;
11. an undivided 1/8 interest to Ink Holdings on April 27,2007;
12. an undivided 1/8 interest to Olympic West Group on August 25, 2006;
13. an undivided 1/8 interest to Opel Funding on April 17,2007;
14. an undivided 1/8 interest to Portland Associates on February 12,2006;
15. an undivided 1/8 interest to Stevenson Affiliates on September 15, 2006; and
16. an undivided 1/8 interest to Thorton Group on January 22,2007.
These sixteen "undivided 1/8 interest" transfers purportedly exceed what the original borrower
even owned.
Fractional interests were transferred to the various debtors around the petition date, both pre and
post petition. None of the properties where the original borrower transferred a fractional interest to the
debtors and that are subject to the relief from stay motions were listed in the debtors* schedules. There
is no proof of the debtors' interest in the properties, other than the fact that the original borrowers
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1

transferredfractionalinterests in the properties to the debtors around the time the petition was filed. All

2

these cases were chapter 13 cases.

3

It appears that these cases werefraudulentlyfiled solely to invoke the automatic stay under 11

4
5
6

U.S.C § 362 to prevent foreclosures. Accordingly, there does not appear to be any intent to honestly
prosecute these bankruptcy cases.

7
8
9

Based upon a review of the dockets and documentsfiledin each of these cases, it appears that
the following individuals are involved in thefraudulentfiling of these bankruptcy cases ("Involved
Persons"):1

10

•

Gary Barnette dba Marengo Associates

12

•

Samuel Andrews dba Carpenter Group

13

WHEREFORE,, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Gary Barnette dba Marengo Associates and

11

14

Samuel Andrews dba Carpenter Group shall show cause why the Court should not make afindingthat

15
16

these transfers are part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and why an omnibus order

17

granting relief from the automatic stay applicable to all real property interests transferred to such

18

debtor(s) should not be entered for any party having an interest in such property without a court hearing

19

for any transfers made to this debtor or hisfictitiousbusiness name, whether such transfer was made in

20

the past or in the future, annulled to the petition date. It is contemplated that if relief is afforded

21
22

pursuant to (his OSC, there will be no need for a party who has an interest in properties transferred to

23

these debtors to file a motion for relief from the automatic stay as against these debtors and any other

24

debtor that subsequently obtains an interest in property that was transferred to these debtors.

25
26
27
28

1

The fact that this Court lists these persons should not be taken to mean that the Court believes all of these persons really
exist. The Court reserves judgment on whether fictitious names are being used. Additionally, other unknown persons may be
a part of thisfraudulentscheme. To the extent that further evidence comes out at the hearing on this Order to Show Cause
supporting the Court's suspicions as to the existence of other participating persons, the Court may issue further Orders to
Show Cause against them.

-6
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Responses to this Order to Show Cause, if any, shall be in writing andfiledwith the Court and
served on the Chapter 13 trustee and the U.S. Trustee on or before June 18,2008. Any opposition not
filed may be deemed waived.

DATED: June 12, 2008

United States Bankruptcy Judge
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Counsel for Option One Mortgage
Jennifer C Wong bknotice@mccarthvholthus.com
Counsel for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc,
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Counsel for National City Bank
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Gary Barnette
23545 Crenshaw Bl
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Samuel Andrews
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Counsel for Countrywide Bank
Mark Domeyer mdomever@rriilesieqal.com
Chapter 13 Trustee
Kathy A Dockery pqozun@ch13la.com
United States Trustee (LA)

ustpreaioni 6.la.ecf@usdoi.gov
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ORIGINAL
I
2

PETER C. ANDERSON
United States Trustee
CLERK U.S. SANKRUfTCV COURT
Jill Sturtevant, SBN 89395
C E N T H A L C ! S : R I C T F 2AUTOHN|
•V
Assistant U.S. Trustee
_____ Ctfvtf Cfel*
Alvin Mar, SBN 151482
Trial Attorney
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2600
Los Angeles, California 90017
(213) 894-4219
(213) 894-2603 facsimile number
C

3
4
5
6
7

A

CENTRAL rcrttat OF CALIFO/WA
OY
i
/I
IV
DtpgtyCkrlt

7

8
9
10

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES DIVISION

11
12

13 J

In re

Case No. 2:08-bk-11370-AA
Chapter 13

SAMUEL ANDREWS dba Carpenter Group,

£w&a*\ R&U6F

14
15
16

Debtor.

ORDER ON COURT'S
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Date: JULY 2, 2008
Time: 11:30 A.M.
Courtroom: 1375

17
18

This matter came before the Court at the above stated hearij

19

date and time with appearances as noted on the record. The Cour

20

finding no objections filed in connection with its Order to Sh<

21

Cause, finds that the real property transfers described in this

22

Court's Order to Show Cause are part of a scheme to hinder, delay,

23

or defraud creditors.

This Court finding good cause therein -

24

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the automatic stay as to all real

25

property transfers to the Debtor or to his fictitious business

26

name, whether made pre-petition or post-petition, shall be and

27

hereby is annulled effective February 1, 2008,

28

the automatic stay shall be effective for two years from the date

Such relief from
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008

of the entry of this order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362 (d) (4).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any creditor having a security
interest in any real property held in the name of- the Debtor or
Debtor's fictitious business name, whether in whole or in part,
need not file a motion for relief from the automatic stay as
against the Debtor or Debtor's fictitious business name, but that
such creditor is required to comply with applicable state law
regarding the recording requirements of 11 U.S.C. §362(d){4).

United States Bankruptcy Judge
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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, state of
California, in the Office of the Unites States Trustee under the
supervision of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction
the service hereinafter described was made; I am over the age of 18
and not a party to the within action; and my business address is:
725 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2600, Los Angeles California
90017,
On
JUL 7 2008 f i served the foregoing document described
as: ORDER ON COURT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE on the interested parties
at their last known address in the action by placing a true and
correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope with sufficient postage
thereon full prepaid, in the United States Mail at Los angeles,
California, addressed as follows:
DEBTOR:
Samuel Andrews
dba Carpenter Group
6300 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90048
DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY:
in pro se
CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE:
Kathy A- Dockery
700 S. Flower Street, Suite 1950
Los Angeles, CA 90017
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct.
Dated:

J0L 7 2008

("U^vj^^^
Carol Fusilier
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - AMERICAN FORK COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DFI PROPERTIES, LLC,

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

PLAINTIFF,
vs.
GR 2 ENTERPRISES, LLC,

CASE
-9S0103876..
APPEAL 20081067-CA

DEFENDANT.

BE IT REMEMBERED

JUDGE DAVID MORTENSEN

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on December 8, 2008.
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
(From CD Recording)

ORIGINAL

FILED

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County; State of Utah I

PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER
^
LIC. 102811-7801
PHONE:
(801)
EMAIL:
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84133
FOR DEFENDANT:
RANDALL L. JEFFS, ESQ.
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 NORTH 200 EAST
PROVO UT 84603
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on/lo ~>

PHR-0-C-EHS~D-I~N--G--S
(December 8, 2008)
(Recording turned on late),
MR. JEFFS:

—

other things that a, he would not

vacate the home, I would no longer be allowed to represent
him, and that I would not be allowed and should have no
further contact with him whatsoever.

And at that point he

refused to talk to me further,
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

I've also received, and I

don't know if any of you have received, some documents which
were filed in court today by Mr, Granados.

Have any of you

received those?
MR. PRICE:

(Short includible).

THE JUDGE:

Excuse me, Mr. Price?

MR. PRICE:

No, I have not.

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

What we have is a document,

it's a, it's stamped dated for .today's date in my court.
It's also a, stamp dated by the Ministry of Justice for the
Nato Indian Nation.

There's three documents.

A petition

for hearing to show cause, stay of proceedings and a
declaratory relief.

The second document is an order to

stay the proceedings, this order issued by a Judge Henry
Clayton from the First Federal District Court Western Region
of the Nato Indian Nation says that it is staying this
action and the action of the Superior Court of California,
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And then the third document is an order, order for hearing
to show cause scheduled for December 16, 2008.
"At a time and place to be determined".

I quote:

I'm not so sure

that complies with due process since it doesn't tell us where
the hearing is to take place.
In any event, this is a serious issue.

I've

already forwarded it on to a representative of the a,
Administrative Office of the Courts to the extent that any
of it can be construed to be ordering me to do anything.
I also plan to refer the matter to the county attorney for
prosecution.

But at a minimum a, and Mr. Jeffs, we will let

you out of this case rather shortly.
MR. JEFFS:

Uh~huh (affirmative).

THE JUDGE:

But the first thing I need to do is

to have a Rule 11 contempt hearing in the next a, little
while to decide whether to strike all of defendant's
pleadings and enter a default based on a Rule 11 violation.
MR. JEFFS:

Okay.

THE JUDGE:

So that's what I want to schedule.

Because since your client hasn't moved, the purpose of our
hearing today was to find out whether your client had moved
out.
MR. PRICE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

THE JUDGE:

And in the event he hadn't we were

going to stick to our trial date.

However, given these
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intervening pleadings a, I am not willing to interfere with
the lives of a, 30 to 40 members of our public when a bad
faith action such as this have tciken place.
So, I'm going to impose on you, Mr, Jeffs, to a,
because at the moment you1re still counsel of record, and I
totally understand the perplexing and uncomfortable situation
that this puts you in.
MR. JEFFS:

Thank you.

THE JUDGE:

And if you can just abide a little

further a, we will release you from this case because it's
not tenable for you to continue under the circumstances.
MR. JEFFS:

Great,

THE JUDGE:

But I need to have a hearing.

Mr. Price, how is your availability this week?
MR. PRICE:

I will work around the court's

schedule, Your Honor.
^ THE JUDGE:

Okay.

How, how you do you look

tomorrow?
MR. PRICE:

Ifm wide open.

MR. JEFFS:

I have an oral argument at 9:00 a.m.

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

(Short inaudible discussion

with clerk?)
THE CLERK:

(Short inaudible, no mic),

THE JUDGE:

I'm looking at maybe 2:30 tomorrow

afternoon.
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MR. JEFFS:

Okay.

THE CLERK:

(Short inaudible, no mic).

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

We'll have a hearing tomorrow

at 2:30 on the court sua sponte Rule 11 determination.

It's

the allegation of the court, and you'll need to put this
probably the a letter to your client, Mr. Jeffs.
MR. JEFFS:

Okay.

THE JUDGE:

And a, if you fear for your safety I

would suggest you employ a constable to serve your letter.
MR. JEFFS:

Okay.

THE JUDGE:

It is. the allegation of the court

that the pleadings which have been filed a, have been done
for an improper purpose to unnecessarily delay this matter.
Secondly, to needlessly increase the costs of litigation.
That the allegations in the petition are not warranted by
existing law and are in fact frivolous.

And that the judge

or the purported judge who signed these documents should
already have notice that they wouldn't be recognized by a
court since there's a 10th Circuit opinion noting that
this a, purported tribe isn't recognized by the Department of
Interior, which is a.significant issue jurisdictionally.
Additionally, I would note that apparently
Mr. Granados is attempting to move forward pro se
representing a corporate entity,, which as we all know is not
going to happen.
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So in your letter also inform him that if he wants

1
2

to be heard he'll need to bring a lawyer.

3

MR. JEFFS:

Okay.

4

THE JUDGE:

All right.

5

MR. PRICE:

Your Honor, this is Thomas Price.

6

If I may indulge the court, could I get the court to fax me a

7 copy of those documents today—
8

THE JUDGE

You bet.

9

MR. PRICE

—

10

THE JUDGE

You bet.

11

number here.

so I can look at them?
Let's verify your a, fax

I probably have it on the pleading.

12

MR. PRICE:

Yes, sir.

13

THE JUDGE:

801-364-9127.

14

MR. PRICE:

That is correct.

15

THE JUDGE:

All right.

16

That will be faxed to you

in the next few minutes.
Is there anything else the parties want me to

17
18

address today?

I would anticipate, Mr. Jeffs, that at the

19

end of the hearing tomorrow I'11 make a final ruling on your

20 motion to withdraw.
MR. JEFFS:

Okay.

23

THE JUDGE:

I would do that, yes.

24

MR. JEFFS:

Yes. Okay.

25

THE JUDGE:

Anything else, Mr. Price?

21

And so I should attend that

22 hearing?
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MR. PRICE:

You know, Your Honor/ I!ve never, I

don't know how to prepare for this hearing.
one of these before.
THE JUDGE:

Ifve never had

But no, I'm good.
Okay.

Well, obviously if you need...

I'm giving you a very short time.
MR. PRICE:

Yes.

THE JUDGE:

The pleadings we're going to fax

to you are not obviously involved.

But if you wanted to

file something on behalf of your client you can do that.
I just, it needs to be noted and it's important to note that
the a, hearing is being set at the court's own initiative
because—
MR. PRICE:

Yes, that's fine.

THE JUDGE:

—

the safe harbor provisions of

Rule 11 only apply to'parties, not the court.
I'd have to wait 21 days.

Otherwise,

If you were to make a Rule 11

motion I can't act on it for 21 days.

But on my own motion I

can, I can do that immediately.
MR.'PRICE:

All right.

I'll be there and ready

at 2:30, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

Very good.

MR. JEFFS:

As will I.

THE JUDGE:

We'll see you tomorrow.

MR. JEFFS:

Thank you.

WHEREUPON, the proceeding was concluded. .
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)

)
COUNTY OF UTAH

SS,

)

I, Penny C, Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify
that I received the electronically recorded CD 08-23HRM2

in

the matter of DFI VS. GR 2, hearing date December 8, 2008,
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full,
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered
1 through 8, inclusive except where it is indicated that the
tape recording was inaudible,
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 17th day of
February, 2009.

P E W Y C. ABBOTT, ^OURT
License 22(=*02811-7801
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-12

PENNY C ABBOTT
Norm PUBLIC • STAJIOIUTAII
COMMISSION NO. 575806

L

OOMM. EXP. 09/24/2012
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GR 2 ENTERPRISES, LLC,

CASE
APPEAL

DEFENDANT.

BE IT REMEMBERED

20081067-CA

JUDGE DAVID MORTENSEN

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on

December 9, 2008.

WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:
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(From CD Recording)

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

&J1S&1 ^J

ORIGINAL
-•- 0294
PENNY C. ABBOTT, REPORTER-TRANSCRIBER
LIC. 102811-7801
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter423-6463
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
BYU.
PHONE:
(801)
EMAIL:
abbpe@yahoo.com
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•. PAGE 1

A-P-P-E-A-R-A-N-C-E-S
FOR PLAINTIFF:
THOMAS B. PRICE, ESQ.
• CALLISTER NEBEKER & MCCULLOUGH
GATEWAY TOWER EAST #900
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84133
FOR DEFENDANT:
RANDALL L. JEFFS, ESQ.
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 NORTH 200 EAST
PROVO UT 84603
MR. GRANADOS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE REF
DISCUSSION.
BY MR. GRANADOS
BY MR. PRICE

.

COURT'S RULING

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
4
5
6
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
(December 9, 2008)
THE JUDGE:

Very good.

I'm. going to call the next

case DFI Properties, LLC versus GR 2 Enterprises, LLC,

This

is case 080103867.
Will counsel state their appearances?
MR, PRICE:

Thomas Price for and on behalf of

DFI Properties, Your Honor.
MR. JEFFS:

Randall Jeffs on behalf of

GR 2 Enterprises.
THE JUDGE:

Thank you-

This matter was set

yesterday by order of this court sua sponte on the court's
Rule 11 motion.

It's based upon some documents that this

court received and communication to the court that a, a
communication between Mr. Jeffs and his client had ceased.
Has that situation changed at all?
MR. JEFFS:

It has not, Your Honor.

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR. JEFFS:

I'm still under instructions not to

have further contact.

Per the court's instructions I drafted

a letter outlining the results of yesterday's telephone
conference and had it served by a constable.

I have that

service.
THE JUDGE:

And it appears that Mr. Granados is

here present in the courtroom.
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Mr, Granados, is it accurate that Mr. Jeffs is no
longer serving as the, it's your desire that Mr. Jeffs no
longer serve as the attorney of GR 2 Enterprises?
MR. GRANADOS:

According to a letter he sent me

two days ago that he requires more money (inaudible, away
from mic).
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Mr. Jeffs, I'm going to ask

you to stay here because I haven't released you yet but you
may take a seat.

And I'll allow Mr. Granados to come up here

to counsel table.
Mr. Granados, I have before me three documents.
They were filed with the court yesterday.

They carry a

caption which is not the caption of this case.

It says,

In regards of Juan Antonio Granados
versus DFI Funding, Inc. and DFI
Properties, LLC.
All three of them appear to be signed a, by you
both as the petitioner and as the petitioner on the mailing
certificate.

Is that correct?

MR. GRANADOS:
THE JUDGE:

That's correct.
Thatfs your signature?

All right.

One of them is a petition for hearing to show
cause, stay of petition, and for declaratory relief.
second is an order to stay proceedings.

The

And the third is an

order to, for hearing to show cause setting a hearing on the
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16th of December, 2008 at a time and place to be

2

determined.

3

hearing is contained in the documents.

4

issued by the First Federal District Court in the, of Western

5

Region.

6

until yesterday when I received these pleadings and did a

7

Lexus search which shows that the 10th Circuit Court of

8

Appeals was familiar with this.

So neither the location nor the time for that

A court with which a, this court was not familiar

At that time I gave Mr. Price the opportunity to

9
10

respond to these pleadings if he chose.

11

written response.

I haven't seen a

Did you file one?

12

MR. PRICE:

No, Your Honor.

.13

THE JUDGE:

All right.

14

It's ostensibly

The purported order that

I've received purports to stay this case.

15

Now, Mr. Granados, did you cause these documents to

16

be filed in this court?

17

MR. GRANADOS:

18

THE JUDGE:

I brought them myself, Your Honor.

Okay.

I'm going to let you be

19

heard.

20

believes that on their face these a, documents are presented

21

for an improper purpose, specifically to unnecessarily delay

22

or needlessly increase the costs of litigation here.

23

court has reviewed them and found that their legal

24

contentions are not warranted by existing law and are in fact

25

frivolous, and that the allegations in them a, don't have

The reason we're here is the court on its motion
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evidentiary support.
I'm going to let you address the court on what you
think should happen at this point.
MR. GRANADOS:

The first thing, as I expressed at

the beginning, is that Mr- Jeff my legal counsel, when he
sent me the letter a, giving me instructions coming from this
court that the thing that I needed to do and the thing that
he needed to do to help me*
getting really sick.

From the very moment I started

I mean, it really hit me and I've been

sick since then until this day.
And so and I tried to find a solution to a, get the
help that I needed including finding the money that he needed
to, to represent me.

Because I couldn't (short

indecipherable) my illness I had to find other avenues, other
resources and that's why I ended up getting to file these
documents.
Because I believe, Your Honor, honestly with all
my heart, I have been an honorable citizen of this country
all my life, and I believe this is a cause that I need to
pursue, otherwise it will be dropped.

But I need, I need to

a, and those things that I believe that I worked so honestly
hard all my life to continue to find a solution, a good
solution that will help me at least to understand.
nothing else can be done I won't do nothing else.

And if
But I

believe that it's there because I, I feel in my heart,
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Your Honor, that we can do something to find a solution to
this problem.

I

tried to find it but the other party has

not helped or cooperated from the very beginning.

And I

have witnesses to that part that they have refused to work
with me and a, that's why we've come to this point where we
are right now.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR, GRANADOS:

Anything else?

Well, I...

The other thing is

that a letter I received yesterday late, in the evening or it
was dark already, it's a very short time for me to find
somebody else to help me legally.

It's very impossible for

me to find (short indecipherable) another attorney to help
me.

from us.

THE JUDGE:

Mr. Price?

MR. PRICE:

It's about 21 days early for a motion

What we hope to see the court do is to strike

GR 2's answer and counterclaim and grant our complaint, DFl's
complaint, and so we can move forward with the property.
In the event that's not done we would like to see an
expedited proceeding for the a, appearance to appear, I mean
notice to appear on the point and get this thing going.

We'd

like to get this a, this thing resolved.
The reason that DFI has not responded to the a,
three pleadings of yesterday we wanted to see what was going
to happen here first and try to keep my client's expenses to
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a minimum as well.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
looking for*

Okay.

I can't find the statute I'm

I'm going to take a two minute recess while I

find the statute.
(Recess)
COURTfS RULING
THE JUDGE:

Please be seated.

We're back on the

record of DFI Properties, LLC versus GR 2 Enterprises.
Mr. Granados, I want to tell you first what I've
done already yesterday and then tell you what I'm going to do
today.
Upon receipt of these documents and looking at the
internet and finding a couple of cases, one being the 10th
Circuit case of Nato Nation versus State of Utah where the
court plainly affirmed a finding that the Department of the
Interior of the United States of America has failed to
recognize the Nato Nation as, as an entity that has
standing.

I personally reviewed the Bureau of Indian

Affairs listing of federally recognized Indian entities
yesterday as well.

Neither this a, entity nor the First

Federal District Court Western Region are recognized by any
state or federal court.
Based upon that I turn then to the Criminal Code of
the State of Utah.

Under 76-8-504, a person is guilty of a
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Class A a, or Class B Misdemeanor if with intent to deceive a
public servant such as a judge in the performance of an
official function that person makes any written false
statement, or knowingly creates a false impression in a
written application, or invites reliance on any writing which
he knows to be lacking authority.
Now, I'm not saying you're guilty of that crime/
Mr. Granados.

But there would be under these circumstances

a question as to whether you knew that these were not
documents to be recognized by the courts of the State of
Utah.
Further, 76-8-513 provides a specific crime of
false judicial or official notice.
A person is guilty of a Class B
misdemeanor who, with purpose to procure
the compliance of another with a request
made by that person, knowingly sends,
mails or delivers to the person a notice
or other writing which has no judicial or
other sanction but which in its format or
appearance simulates a summons,
complaint, court order or process, or an
insignia, seal or printed form of a
federal,, state or local government or an
instrumentality thereof, or is otherwise
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calculated to induce a belief that it
does have a judicial or other official
sanction.
The order of stay in this matter purports to be
from a court, purports to be signed by a judge, and purports
to order that this matter is stayed.

I find it likely that

that document violates that statute as well.
Even absent that, however, I find that there's no
reasonable basis to believe that these documents are
anything other than frivolous, that they have been submitted
to this court for, the only reason was to delay these
proceedings.
Based upon that finding under Rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure I'm going to strike your answer and
your counterclaim and enter a default against you.
Do you have a writ?

copy?

MR. PRICE:

Yes, Your Honor.

May I approach?

THE JUDGE:

You may.

want to make a

Do you

Do you have of ai copy?
MR. PRICE:

I don't, Honor.

THE JUDGE:

Dallas, will you make a copy of

that?
MR. PRICE:

If you want, Your Honor, also (short

inaudible, away from mic).
While my clerk is making the copies
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I need to make one other item of note here, Mr. Granados.
Should you attempt to take any actions in this
case in this court or any other court in the state such as
the court of appeals or the supreme court, you must be
advised that a corporate entity such as an LLC may not be
represented by anyone who is not licensed to practice law
in the State of Utah/

Specifically what that means is if

you attempt to represent GR 2 Enterprises in any proceeding,
whether in a district court or an appellate court, they will
not recognize you and they will not accept your pleadings.
You must find someone who is licensed to practice law in the
State of Utah.
I'm going to ask my bailiff to give a copy of that
writ that I'm issuing now to Mr. Granados.
reflect he has received a copy of it.

The record will

That writ instructs

you to vacate the home within three days.

If you are not

out of the house in three days I'll issue an order for the
sheriffs to remove.you.
Anything else, Mr. Price?
MR. PRICE:

Was the judgment to your

satisfaction?
THE JUDGE:

It is.

It's been, it's been executed

MR. PRICE:

Thank you.

THE JUDGE:

Anything else, Mr. Price?

as well.
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MR. PRICE:

No.

THE JUDGE:

That's the order of the court.

BAILIFF:

Thank you, Your Honor.

All rise,

THE JUDGE:

Your motion is granted.

You're

MR* JEFFS:

Thank you.

THE JUDGE:

Did you give me an order earlier?

MR. JEFFS:

(Short inaudible, away from mic).

THE JUDGE:

All right.

released.

At this point I've

stricken the trial date so actually you1re able to a,
withdraw by way of notice.
MR. JEFFS:

Fine with me.

THE JUDGE:

Don't you agreee, Mr. Price?

MR. PRICE:

Oh, yes.

THE JUDGE:

With no pending trial date? All

Absolutely.

right.
MR. JEFFS:

Thank you.

WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded.
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
(December 23, 2008)
THE JUDGE:

Please be seated-

I'm going to call

the matter of DFI Properties versus GR 2 Enterprises, case
080103867.
Counsel, if you'll state you appearances.
MR, NADESAN:
MR. PRICE:

Defendant present.
Thomas Price on behalf of

DFI Properties,
THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

little bit early today.

I appreciate you coming a

As Mr, Nadesan knows I just

finished my calendar a few minutes ago from this morning.
But we1re not recording.
THE CLERK:

(Short inaudible, no mic).

THE JUDGE:

All right.

I111 state again for the

record, for the recording, this is case 080103867.

Counsel

have made their appearances.
We're here on defendant's motion for a stay and
for a, to set aside the judgment the court previously
entered.

I have reviewed your pleadings including one that

was faxed to the court a, just yesterday evening, I believe,
and I've reviewed all of that.
arguments.

Am prepared to hear your

You may proceed.
ARGUMENT BY MR. NADESAN

MR. NADESAN:

Your Honor, first I'd like to say I
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appreciate the fact that you scheduled this hearing on such
short notice.

I know you have a busy schedule.

So I thank

you for that.
The reason why I filed the motion, Your Honor, is
because I believe that the Rule 11 was not followed, the
procedures specified by Rule 11 were not followed at the
previous hearing.

I believe that was because of the haste

of the situation.
From my understanding, since I just started the
case, my client filed a petition to remove to the Nato Nation
Indian Tribal court.
THE JUDGE:

Well, do you have those pleadings,

copies of them?
MR. NADESAN:

I have just received them,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
MR, NADESAN:
ago.

Today?
From my client just a couple days

I have not had a chance to fully review them.
THE JUDGE:

Well, the reason I asked is because

a, that's really not what they are.

At least from the face

of the documents.
One of them is an order staying proceedings.
It's an order purported to be from the First Federal District
Court of the Western Region, whatever that is.

But it

purports to order my case, this case here and the case in
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California stayed, and sets an order to show cause hearing
for the same day as, as my hearing, I believe.
No.

Oh,

Let1s see.

for the first of a, the trial that I had set,

although it indicated that the place and the time would be
later indicated.
I believe the petition was a copy of the petition
that Mr. Granados ostensibly filed, at least that's what it
appears to me to be, in the a, First Federal District Court
Western Region.
MR. NADESAN:
THE JUDGE:

I understand, Your Honor.
So I, I don't think it's a, I didn't

see anything asking for removal.
MR. NADESAN:

Your Honor, and I believe that's

because Mr. Granados is not an attorney.

I believe what

happened was that he was relying on the advice of Henry
Clayton from the First Federal Court who told him what
the procedure was for moving to Indian court.
believe he actually knew what he was filing.

I don't
I believe he

was just following the forms that were given to him.

And so

I believe that what it was was a poorly executed removal in
the same way that, you know, if we moved to federal court
you would usually enter an order saying the stay of
proceedings, or notifying the court that it needs to stay
proceedings pending the disposition in federal court.
However, what I think is, is apparent though is
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that it was not an attempt to defy the court's authority
because when the court held its hearing the next day
Mr. Granados showed up,

I would, I would believe that if

Mr. Granados was denying the courts authority he would have
said well, the court no longer has. jurisdiction, I.1 in" not
going to show up, I'm not going to, I'm not going to vacate
and obey.

Which he did, he vacated.the premises, he obeyed

the court's order to vacate.
set aside.

And he's filed a motion to

So I do not believe that Mr. Granados believed

that he was defying the court.
I believe that he was following poor advice,
granted, from a non-lawyer.

Because from the Nato Indian

Nation Versus Utah case it's apparently that Mr. Clayton is
not a lawyer and he should not have done that.
I think an additional problem is, is that
Mr. Granados could not act for GR 2 Enterprises because he's
not an attorney.

And so the pleading, petition itself should

probably be struck from the record as being legally
nonsignificant because Mr. Granados cannot act for GR 2
within this court.
THE JUDGE:

Do you know why those documents

haven't been withdrawn?
MR. NADESAN:

Your Honor, I apologize, but I, I

would be happy to withdraw those documents.

The only

reason

why they haven't been withdrawn was because I wanted to hear
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the motion to set aside the judgment and see if Your Honor
wanted to continue with the case.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

MR. NADESAN:

But we would be happy to withdraw

those documents,
THE JUDGE:

All right.

Any other arguments you

want?
MR. NADESAN:

Since you're aware of the pleadings

I feel it's probably a waste of the court's time if I go
through the arguments that I've laid out in the pleadings.
If you have any particular questions I'd be happy to answer
them but-—
THE JUDGE:

I don't.

You'll have some time after

we hear from Mr. Price.
MR. NADESAN:

Thank you, Your Honor

ARGUMENT BY MR. PRICE
MR. PRICE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

First, DFI would also like to a, recognize the
court's indulgence in having this hearing done so quickly.
We do appreciate it.

We'd like to get this matter

resolved as quickly as possible so we can continue with our
business.
First we feel that a, GR 2 has failed to meet the
a, standard of Rule 60.

Rule 60(b) is about getting relief

from an order of a judgment and it enumerates certain
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situations in which the judgment can be set aside.

GR 2

does not a, assert any of the, any of the first five.
It relies upon 6 that reads,
Any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.
And as we have briefed, as DFI briefed, Your Honor,
that is a pretty high standard for unusual circumstances in
order to set this judgment aside.
What Rule 60 does not allow is for a second bite
of the apple, for a chance to have another a hearing or an
appeal or to make the arguments.
process is for.

That's what an appellate

We feel that a, GR 2 is, is* basically

making a new argument over what was decided last time we
met.

In fact, it was ill prepared, hasn't really looked at

the a, at the pleadings.

We think that a, GR 2 has failed

to meet that burden.
The case I recited was quote, should be 60(b), in
this, in the a, most recent amended version of the Rule (6)
should be very cautiously and sparingly
invoked by the court only in unusual and
exceptional instances.
And we don't think we have risen to the level of,
of that, Your Honor, of unusual and exceptional instances.
In the event that the court is considering it we
would like to address some of the arguments that I, just
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briefly.
There was, the context of this matter as the court
knows was an expedited situation pursuant to the statute at
the court's discretion, we were unlawful detainer status
because of GR 2's refusal to leave the home.
found ourselves.

That's where we

It was also—

THE JUDGE:

An opportunity which I gave GR 2 —

MR. PRICE:

Exactly, Your Honor.

THE JUDGE:

—

MR. PRICE:

Upon their motion they were trying

to express—

to leave, we had an expedited telephone conference where he
had an opportunity to leave and failed to do so.

And so

a,—
THE JUDGE:

Well, really twice.

Because the

first time that option was placed on the table was here in
this courtroom,

I asked right then, in fact I think we took

a recess, 10 or 15, maybe even 20 minutes so that Mr. Rivers
could go consult with Mr. Granados in the hall and see if he
wanted to vacate the home.

Whereupon, as I explained to the

parties, that would release me from the 60 day trial rule,,
which while you may think it's discretionary I don't think
the legislative language...
This happens to be a law where

I actually

personally listened to the debates at the senate on this
bill, on the bill that became law.

Their intention really
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is, and one of the issues that was actually brought up, it
was quite interesting, is they said well, you know, this
might be an okay situation for an apartment, you know, $500
a month apartment.

But we don't think- this should apply to

more expensive properties and commercial properties.

There

was a very big concern that you might have a multimillion
dollar business in a multimillion dollar building and you
have to have a trial in 60 days.

And the senate basically

said we don't care, we1re setting it as a hard and fast
deadline.
And so the only discretion Ir ve seen

in the

statute is that it's subject to the availability of my
calendar-

But since I did have two days open within the

60 day period I didn't think I had discretion.

Obviously a

constitutional right to a jury trial by a criminal defendant
would trump the statutory, and I think the statute actually
makes, makes way for that.
I just wanted to make that point, especially if
we 1 re going to have an .appellate review,

I read the statute

as mandating a trial within 60 days.
MR. PRICE:

Yes.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Duly

noted.
And, and we, DFI Properties tried to a, to help in
any way that it could as far as meeting with the
teleconferences and, and trying to agree to get a, when
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Mr. Granado agreed to, to leave.
But the bottom line is that a, on December 9th
when it was, and counsel for Mr. Granados for GR 2

notified

the court we were less than 10 days away from trial and so
any, any longer time for the notice would have been unduly
prejudicial to, to my client as we were trying to prepare for
a, for trial.
GR 2 also makes issue over there was no written
order by the court pursuant to Rule 11(c)(3).

As I read

11(3)(c), Your Honor, there needs to be a statement by the
court.

It doesn't say that it needs to be a written

order.

And a review of the, of the record shows the court

did meet that standard and Rule 11(c)(3).
Pursuant to the notice that is provided in the
Rule 11 we argue, Your Honor, that Mr. Granados and GR 2 did
have an opportunity to respond.

There was a, their counsel,

Mr. Jeffs'was in the area sitting in the gallery and
available.

The court had a not granted his motion to

withdraw.
THE .JUDGE:

I expressly denied it prior to that

MR. PRICE:

Yes, Your Honor.

point.
And Mr., oh,

I

forget his name.
THE JUDGE:

The attorney?

MR. PRICE:

Mr. Clayton.was also in the
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gallery.

I don't know if he is currently a, an attorney-

He represented himself to me as a judge.

I don't know if

that was the person that Mr. Granados represented he was
taking advice from.

But there was certainly ample

opportunity here to have counsel, and he had a day to

find

someone, an attorney here in Utah County or Salt Lake County
or Davis County or somewhere in Utah where they could
represent or at least make an appearance and ask for a, an
extension if necessary for the hearing.

He chose not to.

Also, we have briefed there is a, a standard for
pro se litigants here in Utah.

In the Nelson case that's

in our brief it states that,
A party who represents himself will be
held to the same knowledge and practice
as any qualified member of the Bar.
There's no sliding scale.

If you're pro se

versus a 20 year practitioner or, or a five year
practitioner it's the same.
clearly for pro se litigants.

There are some indulgences
Perhaps they lead their

witnesses, perhaps they are not sure with the, the caption or
how it should look, those indulgences should be made to
pro se litigants..

But filing something that defies the

courts authority, that is sanctionable, certainly should not
be forgiven because hey, I made a mistake.

And therefs case

law on that that pursuant to the pro se not being allowed to,
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to get away with that.
As far as the sanction goes, it's clear that the a,
the sanctions were appropriate.

It is in Rule 11 up to the

court's discretion pursuant to the context of the
sanctionable conduct to levy sanctions.
THE JUDGE:

Well, you would admit that so far as

Utah precedent is concerned a, there does not appear to be a
well established precedent for a dismissal as a sanction?
MR. PRICE:

That's correct, Your Honor.

Trust me,

I have looked high and low for a case and I have been unable
to find one.

• '

• •

THE JUDGE:

Either way.

MR. PRICE:

Either way, that's true.

Yes.

And

then there's, under the rules I, if I could find, if I did
find a case that was against me I clearly would bring that to
the court.
A monetary sanction, Your Honor, by this court in
this situation I'm not sure would dp what it was intended,
what Rule 11 is intended to do.

Let's say hypothetically

that this court was to give a monetary sanction.
whom?

Against

Mr. Granados is obviously in financial dire straits

and we would just have an empty judgment to pursue .
Moreover, in Rule 11(c)(2).

No.

I'm sorry.

It talks about deferring, oh, here it is, yes, (c)(2),
A sanction imposed for violation of
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this rule shall be limited to what is
sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated.
Based upon that phraseology, Your Honor, the
court was right on point according to DFI.

We don't want to

have the courts of this land, the state courts, federal
courts, being supplanted by these fantasy courts that just
pop up.
When a, counsel represented that Mr. Granados
really didn't believe and wasn't really trying to defy this
court's order, I find that hard to believe-

Because on

December 16th it is my understanding that Mr. Granados did
appear down in Sanpete County before this supposed judge and
there was a hearing.
he went.

I haven't heard the results of it but

The hearing was conducted.

So any

representation that Mr. Granados, you know, learned his
lesson or wasn't really sure what to do, I find lacks
credibility.

And a, this thing should, should remain

intact.
Just in summary, Your Honor, just really quickly,
GR 2 fails to meet the standard of Rule 60(b).

They want

another bite of the apple instead of trying to show
something that, that was new, something that wasn't
reasonably foreseeable or reasonably discoverable at the,
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at the original time that the, the court took issue with the
conduct.

It's inappropriate to retry or try to appeal the

court's ruling.

That's not the purpose of Rule 60(b).

And a, lastly, the court did meet the standards of
notice, of an opportunity for GR 2 to respond.

And the, the

sanctions were appropriate.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. NADESAN
MR. NADESAN:

Your Honor, first of all,

Your Honor, Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate for these
circumstances.

What counsel for DFI is pointing to are

cases where people are trying to have an appeal because they
have missed the deadline for filing an appeal, and then file
a motion to set aside judgment.

I have cited several cases

in my brief where, I believe there's was one where there was
a double recovery.

The court said yes, the motion to set

aside would have been appropriate under Rule 60(b).
However, it was inappropriate at that time because they
waited six months before filing their motion so they lost
both their chance for appeal and then were trying to have
their appeal in trial court.
Here we're not appealing the, the Rule 11 hearing.
We ! re saying that the Rule 11 hearing should not have
occurred

the way it occurred becciuse certain procedures
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under Rule 11 were not met.
THE JUDGE:

This i s —

You're also claiming that. I don't

really have the power under Rule 11 to dismiss.
MR. NADESAN:
Your Honor.

I don't believe that's the case.

I'm not sure but I don't believe that's the

case—

.
THE JUDGE:
MR. NADESAN:

Okay.
. — that you have that power.

Then the next thing is DFI claims that GR 2 —
THE JUDGE:

And by the way, I'm not affronted by

anybody telling me that their reading of the law I do or
don't have certain powers so.

I might not agree but

I'm certainly not offended by your advocating for your
client.
MR. NADESAN:

Thank you, Your Honor.

The second point is that GR 2 a, really did not
have an opportunity to address the issue.

Certainly their,

GR 2's lawyer was here but he was sitting in the gallery and
Mr. Granados was asked to respond. . However, Mr. Granados
does not represent GR 2, he can't represent GR 2 in court.
So he, he can positively answer for why he acted in the way
he did, but he can't respond or have any a, bearing on an
argument for GR 2 in a Rule 11 hearing because he cannot
represent GR 2.
Mr. Clayton has never entered an appearance as an
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attorney, so even if he is an attorney nothing Mr. Clayton .
could do would do so.
In this case Mr, Jeffs had set, told GR 2 that he
wanted to withdraw from the case,

Mr. Granados naturally

felt that his attorney, he didn't have an attorney

because

one, had certain suspicions about the attorney's
representation, I'm sure Mr. Jeffs would have done a great
job, but obviously he felt Mr, Jeffs was not going to
represent him properly in trial or court because Mr, Jeffs
wanted to withdraw from the case.

In this case he did

not have an opportunity to find another a lawyer to show
up at the hearing and to represent him at that hearing.

So

in essence GR 2 never spoke or said anything at that
hearing,
DFI, when I filed this motion I filed a motion for,
an ex parte motion for expedited briefing.

DFI, counsel for

DFI called up in this.court and left a message with the court
reporter, called me up and said we want to have an
opportunity to respond to your brief.

So you filed the

motion on Monday, the earliest we can respond is by Friday.
This is on a motion to set aside, not a motion to dismiss the
case.
Clearly a single day's notice even on an expedited
basis is not sufficient.
THE JUDGE:

And certainly—

Well, I don't know what happened
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between the parties.

But I saw the ex parte motion for

expedited briefing on the 17th of December and immediately
issued a ruling and I gave a, I believe, let me see. Yes.
I gave counsel for plaintiff basically a day to respond.
Now, he obviously may have already received it and it may
have been in the works.
I think I should point out that my, at least from
my ruling that's all I gave them as well was a day.
MR. NADESAN:

I understand, Your Honor.

But he

had a day in which to file it, to file a response.
THE JUDGE:

Right.

MR. NADESAN:

In this case GR 2 didn't even have

an opportunity to file a response.
attend a hearing and respond.

The next day it had to

And at the hearing there was

no counsel for GR 2 because his counsel, I know that you
didn't allow Mr. Jeffs to withdraw until after the hearing,
but Mr. Jeffs was allowed the opportunity to go to the
gallery and sit down.

Which he probably shouldn't have

done, he should have probably said I'm still representing
GR 2, I have to respond on behalf of GR 2 because
Mr. Grariados cannot.

But in this, case there was no response

from, from GR 2 because Mr. Granados's response does not
represent the company.
The next i s —
THE JUDGE:

Although he, he is the primary
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principal of GR 2.
MR, NADESAN:

He is the primary principal but

he's not allowed to represent GR 2 in court.

And so for

him to respond would, would be a nullity because just the
same way Mr- Granados cannot file any pleadings on behalf
of GR 2, he would not be able to argue at this hearing on
behalf of GR 2, he doesn't have the ability to answer at a
Rule 11 hearing on behalf of GR 2 because GR 2 actually was
still a represented party, and his attorney is the only
person who could respond on behalf of GR 2 in that
situation.
The next point is in terms of the order itself,
I think If ve made my argument already and I think you
understand about the, the sanction.

I believe that the

Utah Supreme Court has said the normal sanction are
attorney's fees.
THE JUDGE:
MR, NADESAN:

Sure.
I have never seen anything

certainly within Utah that says that a court could dismiss
sua sponte on the.basis of a Rule 11 violation.

It talks

about nonmonetary directives, which I assume would be an
admonishment to an attorney, etcetera.

But I've never

seen a court dismissing it.
In the context of Rule 37 the court certainly has
the power to dismiss the case.

And the cases I've-cited

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

where the court has done that it's been within its
discretion but it's always b£en in cases of egregious
behavior where parties have continually missed discovery,
where they have ignored discovery orders compelling
discovery to be produced, where they have absolutely defied
the

court's a, authority.

Here the client has still done

so.
And I know that, that DFI claims that the First
Court of the West or First Federal Court of the West is an
imaginary court, it's a fantasy court.

Quite frankly,

Your Honor, I'm not an expert on Indian law, I don't know if
it is or isn't.

And the reason why I say that is because

the 10th Circuit ruling on Nato Indian Nation versus Utah
says this is not a court that's recognized by the BIA,
Bureau of Indian affairs.

However, another case I cited

that's included in the reply memo it says that that doesn't
necessarily mean that an Indian tribe doesn't have any
authority whatsoever.

It says that it might still have

treaties that are not statutory within the federal
government but are between treaties of federal government.
I simply don't—
THE JUDGE:

Do you think they would have the

power to have an Indian court under those circumstances
order a stay in a case?
MR. NADESAN:

Absolutely not, Your Honor.
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I think

that there can never be, I think that the only court that can
order a stay of this court is the federal government, the
federal court.
THE JUDGE:
MR. NADESAN:

Or our appellate courts.
Or our appellate courts, that's

correct.
But I believe that what Mr. Granados was trying
to do was an action of comity.

I believe that, you know, if

an, if the state court in California had been dealing with
this same issue it could possibly have, have sent a petition
to you asking you to stay the proceeding here pending the
resolution in California if that was the better venue.
believe that was Mr. Granados's intention.

I

I don't

believe that his intention was to defy the court to say that
you don't have authority or that to order you to stop
because quite frankly, he attended the next day.

If he had

wanted to do that he would have, simply said well now you .no
longer have authority, I'll do that.

Instead he's

proceeding as though there are two jurisdictions involved
that are having concurrent proceedings.

And quite frankly,

if he gets any sort of judgment in the First Court of the
Federal he's still going to have to come to the Utah court to
have the judgment recognized, and clearly at that point the
Utah court will have to decide.

Because I don't believe

during the Rule 11 proceedings the court decided that a, Nato
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Nation court was, had no authority whatsoever.
THE JUDGE:

Oh, actually on the contrary.

If

that wasn't clear on what I said, that's what I meant to
say,
MR. NADESAN:
THE JUDGE:

Okay.
I did indicate to the parties that

not only had I found the 10th Circuit case but I had
conducted additional research such as, and this only took a
matter of minutes, I went, one of the questions in my mind
was just because the 10th Circuit handed, hands down a
ruling saying that it's not on the list of, of recognized
tribes a, by the federal government as of that date, doesn't
necessarily mean that they didn't recognize them in the
meantime.

So I thought it was important that I verify

whether that tribe was recognized.
And so I went to the BIA list the day of the
hearing just minutes prior to it to make sure that in the
intervening time to my surprise they hadn't, you know, maybe
they had been recognized.
not.

But I verified that they had
'

And so I expressly stated the fact that I had done
that search and did not recognize the authority of, of the
tribe or more importantly of this court.
MR. NADESAN:

I understand, Your Honor.

But I

think the, the secondary issue is if a court is not

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l r*T*-l

*"* *"*

recognized by the BIA does that necessarily, does it
necessarily mean if a tribe is not recognized by the BIA does
that necessarily mean that the tribe1s court has no powers
whatsoever.

.

THE. JUDGE:

I wasn't looking at what powers they

might have, if they have a reservation or something.
Specifically what I was looking at was an order telling me
that my case was stayed.
MR. NADESAN:

And, Your Honor, again I note

that

Mr. Granados has filed the order but he certainly didn't
sign the order saying that.

He was told by someone, I

assume Judge Clayton or another officer of the Nato Nation,
that this was the procedure that he needed to follow.
Certainly if Mr. Granados had filed an order telling the
court to stop its proceedings then that would certainly be
sanctionable.

But here he was told.

And he should have,

Ifm not quite sure what he should have done at that point.
Maybe he should have done research into whether a, an Indian
nation that's unrecognized by the BIA should file this or
what the correct procedure for filing it is.

I believe

that under the pro se rule I believe there's a lot of leeway
given to pro se litigants in terms of procedure-

And In

this case he shouldn't have filed that procedure.

What he

should have done was filed a proposed order or something of
that nature in terms of what he filed.
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But certainly I think that, that he never intended
that this be something saying that the court must stop.

In

which case again, I think the strongest evidence that he
didn't believe that was that he would not have shown up the
next day.

I believe what he was asking to do was on the

basis of comity in a concurrent proceeding for the court to
stay its proceedings until that had stopped.
Clearly the, the advice he received and the papers,
the petition he received from, the order he received from
Judge Clayton was incorrect, it shouldn't have been filed.
If he had given that to his lawyer who was the true
representative of GR 2, his lawyer most likely would have
said well, let me investigate this and let me.look at the
correct procedure, you can't file this yourself because you
can't represent GR 2, I would need to file this,

I believe

that's what should have occurred.
And so when Mr. Granados went ahead and filed it
he wasn't following correct procedure and he was filing
papers that belonged to the court to, that were given to him
by Judge Clayton that he was unable to determine being a
layman whether they were the correct papers or not, to file
under the circumstances..
So that, that's my point, Your Honor-

Not that I

believe that the court has the, the Indian court has, you
know, status or can order you to stop.

I don't believe any
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court can order you to stop except for, you know, a federal
court or an appellate court.

I believe that other courts

can ask you to give them comity and allow, and stay your
proceedings/

And I believe that the correct way would be to

file a petition with a proposed order staying,

I believe

that's what should have been sent to you should have been a
proposed order.
I believe that there are Indian cases where, you
know, under the Indian Child Welfcire Act or for crimes
committed on a reservation where sole jurisdiction lies with
an Indian court-

I don't know since I have, I'm not an

Indian law expert and I know we're not here to argue the
Rule 11, whether a Rule 11 violation occurred or not.

I

believe that if you wanted to do that both sides should have
an opportunity to brief that issueBut I am saying that it's unclear from my look,
cursory glance through Utah law whether an unrecognized
tribe has any sort of jurisdiction or not.

And I think

that that issue needs to be looked at least to properly
identify whether this is a Rule 11 violation or not.
But I think on its face given that Mr. Granados is
a layman, given that there are certain circumstances where an
Indian court does have jurisdiction, and given that there is
nothing on the internet certainly that a layman could find
saying that an Indian court, an unrecognized Indian tribe
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doesn't have any authority whatsoever, jurisdiction
whatsoever, I believe that he, it was ostensibly reasonable
for him to file that.
I believe that especially given that he has no
knowledge of procedure within the court that, and as a layman
he had no idea.

I think the correct circumstance he should

have given it to his lawyer and his lawyer should have
determined whether it should be filed.

And I don't think

that he had the right to. file it on behalf of GR 2.,
Now, DFI also talked about the order, about the
sanction.

At the hearing, Your Honor, you never considered

monetary sanctions, you never considered any other type of
sanction or award agaiaist my client.

From my recollection

of the transcript you told, you asked a, the counsel for
DFI what he thought should be done.

Counsel for DFI said I

think you should strike their answer and counterclaim and
enter a default judgment-

And then you chose to do so.

On the record you didn't identify why you thought that
particular sanction versus striking the petition,
admonishing Mr. Granados, giving him a warning that if he
does that kind of behavior again you would dismiss the case,
why any of those other less harsh sanctions were not, were
not chosen versus the sanction of dismissal.

Certainly

dismissal is a very harsh sanction. " And I think that there
needs to be some sort of reasoning and basis.
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you can correct that now if you want about providing such a
basis.

But I believe that there, that the goal of

preventing such a recurrence could have been just as easily
and well accomplished by admonishing Mr. Granado that he
cannot file a pleading on this court on behalf of
GR 2 Enterprises, that if he does that you're going to
strike the pleading, and that if he does so again you'd find
him in contempt of court.

Certainly that seems just as a

workable solution as dismissing GEJ 2 Enterprises's case.
Especially that Mr. Granados cannot represent GR 2.
And a, I believe that's all I had in response to
DFI.

Do you have any questions?
THE JUDGE:

I don't have any questions.

MR. NADESAN:

Thank you
COURT'S RULING

THE JUDGE:

I appreciate your arguments.

I am fully cognizant of a couple of facts.
Number one, I'm cognizant of the lack of Utah precedent on
dismissal as a sanction under Rule 11.

I'm also cognizant

that this.to me at least is an extraordinary case for a
couple of reasons.

I'm going to, Ifm going to address them

in turn.
I'm going to deny the motion for a stay.
one, because I don't think there's a reason to stay.

Number
And

number two, for the stated purposes because the, the home was
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vacated I don't think the matter is as pressing as it once
was.
On the Rule 60(b) motion I'm going to deny that as
well.
If you take the Nato Indian tribe and stick that
into Google, one of the first things that comes up is the
10th Circuit decision.

So I really believe that Mr. Granados

could have a, found that with fairly easy

access.

But I think it is important for me to state on the
record why I'm denying the motion and why I believe these
particular circumstances warrant the sanction which the court
handed down.

The sanction was not handed down without a,

considering a lesser Scinction.
The fact of the matter was these pleadings as such
were filed really on the eve of trial right at, while it
wasn't a day or two days prior to trial, we were all
cognizant of the fact that we're on a very expedited basis.
And there was no doubt given the complexity that had been
expressed by the parties as to the history of this case
that substantial time and money would be incurred by all of
the parties, but DFI in particular, in preparing for the
trial.
I think there are three critical points.

In

prior hearings on this matter it was represented to the court
that the present matter arose out of a transaction in
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California, and I assume that's the case that the order from
the Nato Indian tribe was attempting to stay as well.
In that case it was represented to the court by
proffer that in an initial attempt to avoid foreclosure that
Mr. Granados had a, deeded away fractional interests in his
property and that then serially one after another a each of
those fractional interests declared bankruptcy in the State
of California in an attempt to delay the foreclosure action
until the bankruptcy court in California a, put an order
barring any future petitions for bankruptcy by any of the
fractional interests.
The fact of the matter is is up until Mr. Granados
filed the documents that he did in this case I actually
didn't have an evidentiary basis.
DRI.

That was a proffer by

But I didn't have any evidence that Mr, Granados had in

fact deeded fractional interests.

Maybe true, maybe not.

However/ Mr. Granados in a, in the pleadings that he filed
I believe substantiated that.
me see.

I know he did.

Or maybe, isn't it....

Let

I'm trying to look where it

happened.
Was there an affidavit, affidavit filed by
Mr. Granados somewhere along the line here?
MR. PRICE:

Your-Honor, if I may address that

question.
THE JUDGE:

Sure.
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MR. PRICE:

There was an affidavit but it was

filed with the federal bankruptcy court.
of the California court.

It has the caption

It was not filed with these

Nato—
THE JUDGE:

Well, my point is is it in the

record?
Well, I do have in the record a, the order of the
bankruptcy court showing the fractional interests, 16
undivided l/8th interests.
it.

I can't get my fingertips on

In any event, I have the record from the bankruptcy

court.
I believe there's an acknowledgment from
Mr. Granados in the pleadings about the fact that those a,
l/8th interests were in fact granted.

Although I believe

what he says is, is he was mistaken in following someone
else's advice, much like the present circumstances, that that
would lead to somk sort of help on the a, foreclosure.
My point being is that prior to the.filing of the
Nato Indian purported pleadings I have before me a
circumstance where it already appeared that GR 2 was being
devious is a good word, in trying to avoid the foreclosure.
So that's, that's really factor number one.
Factor two is the timeliness.
what makes this case extraordinary.

That's really

Here I have a

legislative mandate specifically as to holdovers or those in
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a, the circumstances like the present one where a party is
staying in possession of the premises and that is really
what triggers the expedited hearing.

What the legislature

was getting at is that's paramount apparently to them.
They have said that it is public policy that if we have
someone staying over we1re going to have the trial in a
matter of, of 60 days.

When these finally got filed and we

had our hearing we were basically a week out from having our
trial.

And Mr. Granados admitted in open court that the

reason that he, he did it is he said I didn't feel like I had
a choice.

But he essentially was trying to derail this

court1s ability to follow a legislative mandate and have that
trial within 60 days.So in considering a lesser sanction this court
looked at the fact that if I awarded attorney's fees or an
admonition or did- anything else, that would not cure the
significant problem that we had that a trial needed to moye> (Jl^
forward in a number of days.

.^:

The court found it especially egregious that itirL . ...
appears that the specific purpose of filing the order
attempting to stay this case was to derail a trial which had
been set.
While I did take into account that I'm dealing
with a pro se litigant, when it comes to a just and
orderly presentation of matters in the state courts if a
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pro se litigant undertakes activities which undermine the
system I believe that a much more harsher sanction is a,
required.
Now, the counsel for GR 2 was not released until
after the hearing on the sanction, and Mr. Granados as the
principal of GR 2 wanted Mr. Rivers to respond, or if
Mr, Rivers had thought it was appropriate they were given
that a, opportunity.
I also believe that it was within the inherent
power of this court to order a dismissal under these
circumstances.

In the case of Wilde versus RJ Reynolds

Industries, 709 F.2d 585 the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
indicated that,
If a party engages in conduct utterly
inconsistent with the orderly
administration of justice, that dismissal
simply under the inherent powers of the
court may be the appropriate sanction.
And I believe that same thinking applies here.
I would also note that the 9th Circuit in
Hutchinson versus Hensley Flying Service, it doesn't appear
that it's a published case, the citation I have is 2000 U.S.
Lexus 402, indicating that dismissal is an allowable
sanction under Rule 11.

In that case the court looked to an

8th Circuit opinion Carmen versus Treat 7 F.3d 1379 from 1993
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from the 8th Circuit also indicating that dismissal is a
possible sanction.
So in totality I will freely admit and acknowledge
that this, these are exceptional circumstances, and that
typically, if this had been a case where we were months out
from trial I would have looked to a lesser sanction.

But

given the timing of this case and the what I believe blatant
attempt there was here to derail a trial setting, I'm going
to stick with the ruling that I made.
Mr, Price, will you prepare an order?
MR. PRICE:

Yes, I will.

Thank you,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

Anything else from the parties?.

(No recorded response)
WHEREUPON the hearing was concluded.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PAGE 33

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)

)
COUNTY OF UTAH

SS,

)

I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify
that I received the electronically recorded CD #08-35-R2

in

the matter of DFI VS. GR 2, hearing date December 23, 2008,
and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a full,
true and correct transcription of said hearing so recorded
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered
1 through 33, inclusive except where it is indicated that the
tape recording was inaudible,
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 18th day of
February, 2009.

P E M Y C\m ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY
License 22^02811-7801
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-12

PENNY C ABBOTT
NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH
COMMISSION NO. 575806

COMM-EXP* 09/24/2012
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